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ABSTRACT 
JOHN ROCKLAND RHODES: The Army Establishes Control in Santiago: Garrisons, 
Revenue, and Logistical Infrastructure 
(Under the direction of Joseph T. Glatthaar, Louis A. Pérez, Jr., and Wayne E. Lee) 
 
This thesis examines the initial occupation of the Province of Santiago by the U.S. 
Army from the Spanish surrender at Santiago de Cuba on July 17, 1898 to the beginning of 
the complete occupation of Cuba on January 1, 1899. The U.S. Army’s officers, acting in 
accordance with their vast experience as a frontier constabulary, instinctively acted to 
disband the Cuban Liberation Army, establish a monopoly of military force, control the 
Cubans by garrisoning forces in Cuban population centers, and administer the island’s 
revenues. Once in control of the island, the U.S. Army ensured that the policy the McKinley 
administration eventually developed toward the future relationship between the United States 
and Cuba could be implemented and enforced.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The President directs that you be informed that 
the United States is responsible for peace, and 
must maintain order in the territory surrendered 
and in your department, and must protect all 
persons and their property within said jurisdiction. 
Interference from any quarter will not be 
permitted. The Cuban insurgents should be treated 
justly and liberally, but they, with all other, must 
recognize the military occupation and authority of 
the United States and the cessation of hostilities 
proclaimed by this Government.  
- Adjutant General H. C. Corbin to Major 
General H. W. Lawton, Official Correspondence 
(August 16, 1898) 
 
After two months of dealing with several emergency crises that followed the capture 
of Santiago de Cuba on July 17, 1898, the U.S. Army slowly began to gain control of the 
province. On August 26, the last remnants of the disease ridden 5th Corps finally embarked 
for Camp Wikoff at Montauk Point, Long Island. Although the eight regiments of soldiers 
who arrived to garrison the Department of Santiago continued to suffer from high rates of 
malaria and yellow fever until the end of the rainy season in late October, the worst of the 
epidemic had passed. Meanwhile, the Army finished the evacuation of all the Spanish 
prisoners in Santiago, freeing American soldiers who had been guarding them. 
It required much more time and energy to alleviate the disease and hunger among the 
Cuban civilians and soldiers. The Army’s remaining garrison in Cuba and the Red Cross 
	   2	  
distributed over a million rations and large quantities of medicines to destitute Cubans during 
the initial occupation—from the surrender of Santiago to the beginning of the formal 
occupation on January 1, 1899. This American charity helped to stem the rapid rate of death 
among the Cubans from malnutrition and preventable diseases like smallpox and dysentery. 
Unfortunately, after three years of war in which both the Spanish and Cubans waged 
campaigns of devastation against Cuba’s farms and plantations and a month-long U.S. 
blockade, many Cubans required at least some humanitarian assistance throughout the initial 
occupation. 
As officials in the War Department and the officers in Santiago slowly solved the 
major problems of disease, starvation, and the evacuation of the 5th Corps and the Spanish 
prisoners, they turned their attention to controlling the newly established Department of 
Santiago. The commanders of the department, Major General Henry W. Lawton and later 
Brigadier General Leonard Wood, understood that their purpose was to enforce President 
William McKinley’s policy decisions, and they closely followed the orders from McKinley 
and the War Department. The department commander and his subordinates rarely made a 
major policy decision without careful consultation with and formal approval from the War 
Department. Before making policy decisions, however, the War Department still consulted 
frequently with field commanders and staff officers. In fact, officers on the ground in Cuba 
proposed many of the War Department’s policies. During the initial occupation, the 
McKinley administration’s policy concerning the future of Cuban independence remained 
uncertain and intentionally vague. Nonetheless, the President and the War Department made 
it perfectly clear that the garrison in Santiago must maintain order, protect individuals and 
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property from harm, reestablish the rule of law under the old Spanish institutions, end the 
current state of war, and avoid any formal recognition of the Cuban Liberation Army. 
In order to provide the stability that President McKinley had ordered, the Army 
understood that it had to secure control by garrisoning the population centers, and establish a 
monopoly of military force by neutralizing and then disbanding the unrecognized Cuban 
“insurgents.” They had to do this in a manner that would not incite rebellion. Garrisons 
provided the threat of military force that compelled the Cuban Liberation Army forces and 
private civilians to accept, however reluctantly, the laws and polices of the U.S. military 
government. 
Not all the Cuban soldiers were willing to stand by passively while the U.S. Army 
garrisoned the province, and a few advocated resisting the American occupiers just as they 
had defied the Spanish Army. Yet most Cubans believed that the occupation would only last 
a short time and that the United States would follow through with its pre-war promise of 
granting Cuban independence. This, combined with the exhausted and destitute state of the 
Cuban Liberation Army and civilians, led the majority of Cubans to offer the U.S. military 
government their compliance in exchange for rations and jobs.  
To control the Department of Santiago, Army officers had to create the necessary 
infrastructure to support the scattered garrisons. It took some effort, but they slowly began to 
reopen Cuban ports to commerce. Officials immediately began collecting the customs duties 
that were necessary to pay for the occupation. The War Department leadership and the U.S. 
Army’s officers in Santiago understood that effective control of the island required a 
monopoly on the use of military force—or more precisely, the threat of military force—
creating a logistical infrastructure to maintain that force, and managing the spending of all -
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the revenues collected in the province. The process of gaining control bought the McKinley 
administration the necessary time to develop a more durable policy on the future of Cuba and 
provided the War Department with a model for conducting the occupation of the rest of Cuba 
after January 1, 1899. 
This process of garrisoning Santiago Province did not occur simultaneously across 
the province. It started on July 17 in Santiago, Guantánamo, and the surrounding towns that 
the 5th Corps had occupied when the Spanish surrendered. For the first few weeks, Major 
General William R. Shafter and Lawton consolidated their control over this area and focused 
on alleviating the humanitarian crises before they established garrisons in the rest of the 
department. In many cases, the Red Cross and U.S. Army sent humanitarian supplies to the 
more remote towns and villages in the province weeks and even months before American 
troops came to establish garrisons. In effect, the U.S. Army conducted a rolling occupation, 
shadowing the Spanish government’s withdrawal of its soldiers. 
The War Department quickly formulated this simple recipe for controlling the 
Department of Santiago by monopolizing military force and revenue, a practice that differed 
only slightly from the U.S. Army’s traditional role as a frontier constabulary force. In the 
thirty years following the Civil War, the U.S. Army spent far more time involved in civilian 
affairs than fighting Indians on the Western frontier. In Indian Territory, Alaska, Mormon 
Utah, the South during reconstruction and during border disputes and during labor clashes, 
the Army enforced federal policy and laws and provided humanitarian assistance. Fortunately 
for the Army, its vast experience in civil-military relations adequately prepared it for 
occupation duty in Cuba and the other former Spanish colonies. The Army administered and 
occupied Santiago by imposing its existing organizational structure and institutional culture 
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and by using the same methods for controlling civilian populations that it learned from its 
experience on the American western frontier. Although the majority of regular officers in the 
U.S. Army departed with the 5th Corps, the generals, the staff officers, most of the regimental 
commanders, and some of the company and field grade officers who occupied the Province 
of Santiago had decades of experience acting as a frontier constabulary and enforcing federal 
policy on less than willing civilian populations.1 
The majority of the officers and enlisted men with regular Army experience who 
were sent to Santiago during the initial occupation gained their experience in civil-military 
relations and occupation duty from dealing with Indian tribes recently forced on to 
reservations, also known as agencies, in the American West. Although the U.S. Department 
of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs managed the Indians on reservations, the U.S. 
Army often found itself called upon to restore order on the reservations and to deliver food, 
clothing, and other humanitarian supplies during emergencies caused by violence or when 
Indian tribes faced difficulties transitioning from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle on 
reservations that were often ill suited for agriculture. In addition, Army officers served as 
Indian Affairs agents when political appointees were unavailable, and they were responsible 
for any Indians not on reservations. Besides fighting renegade bands that left the reservations 
and providing humanitarian relief during crises, the U.S. Army also sought to protect the 
Indians from encroachment by white settlers and frequently corrupt Indian Bureau officials. 
To accomplish these tasks, the U.S. Army established small garrisons on or near the 
reservations, and wherever possible, it placed them where they could be easily supplied. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Spanish language name for the province is Oriente Province, but the Americans called it Santiago 
Province or the Province of Santiago.  As the analysis in this chapter is from the U.S. Army’s perspective I will 
refer to it as Santiago Province unless I am referencing the province specifically from the Cuban or Spanish 
perspective.  This will prevent confusion when using quotes from Americans, which all use the name Santiago. 
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The U.S. Army regulars in the small posts on the frontier held strongly racist views 
towards the Indians, and during wartime soldiers sometimes used their racial prejudices and 
the excuse of revenge for atrocities committed by Indian war parties to justify their own 
egregious acts. Even in wartime, however, many soldiers treated the non-combatant Indians 
with compassion. Most officers and enlisted soldiers placed the blame for the majority of 
Indian troubles on white settlers and speculators, corrupt and incompetent Indian agents, or 
starvation caused by the placement of Indians on barren reservations. Periods of peace were 
frequent, and at these times, the Army treated the Indians in their charge very humanely, if 
still paternalistically, as the two cultures learned to coexist with each other.2 
This thesis analyzes the methods the U.S. Army used to create garrisons in the 
Department of Santiago in the same order they were established. It begins with a description 
of how the newly arrived garrison regiments consolidated control in the vicinity of the 
Santiago de Cuba, and then examines how the Army employed food and jobs to compel the 
Cuban Liberation Army to disband. This strategy neutralized a potential adversary that 
threatened both the McKinley administration’s slowly developing Cuba policy and the 
Army’s ability to monopolize military force. As they consolidated control, Wood and the 
War Department formalized and refined their procedure and brought order to newly occupied 
towns as the Spanish forces evacuated. Then, as the War Department began to plan for and 
then occupy the remaining five Cuban provinces, its process of establishing a monopoly of 
military force became the norm. Within months of the formal occupation beginning in 
January 1899, Major General John R. Brooke, commanding the Division of Cuba, established 
garrisons in every major town and city in Cuba using the methods developed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Don Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 225-238. 
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Department of Santiago before his arrival. Moreover, after much political wrangling, the 
McKinley administration convinced the commander-in-chief of the Cuban Liberation Army, 
General Máximo Gómez, to disband his army after receiving a guarantee that the U.S. 
government would pay its soldiers a total of $3 million. With no Cuban army left to oppose 
their plans and garrisons controlling every town, the McKinley administration and War 
Department were free to take their time in developing a Cuban policy without facing serious 
military opposition from the Cubans.3 
The few historians who have written on the U.S. occupation of Cuba from 1898 to 
1902 focus on the Platt Amendment. Wood and the War Department threatened not to end 
the occupation and give the Cubans nominal independence unless they accepted the 
amendment verbatim into their constitution. The Platt amendment limited Cuban national 
sovereignty in many ways, including the right for the United States to intervene militarily in 
order to preserve “Cuban independence,” and to protect “life, property, and individual 
liberty.”4 Most scholars of Latin-American history and U.S. imperialism attribute the 
formation of the Platt Amendment to U.S. economic interest, ideas of American 
exceptionalism, and deeply rooted racial prejudices in American society.5  While these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 73-77.  Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 263-266.   
4 Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 2nd Session, XXXIV, 2954. 
5 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, argues that the large majority of American politicians and generals 
who were responsible for administering the Cuban interim government believed in the unfitness of Cubans, as 
racial inferiors, for self-government.  Pérez also asserts that old desires to annex the island, to exploit its 
economic resources, and to prevent Cuban independence motivated the U.S. intervention far more than the 
American desire to assist the Cubans gain independence from Spain. Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-
American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902. 2 vols. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1972), who subscribed to a Marxist economic and class-based interpretation of history, contended that racist 
statements by War Department officials, which included that the Cubans were incapable of self-government, 
were made to support moneyed interests that were lobbying for Cuba’s annexation in order to exploit the island 
and to ensure continued dominance by the wealthy white ruling class.  These wealthy businessmen acceded to 
limited self-rule by the Cuban plutocracy, but only after the Platt Amendment and discriminatory voting laws 
	   8	  
historians adequately describe how and why the Platt Amendment came to fruition within the 
larger historiographical debate on the nature of U.S. imperialism, they do not fully explain 
why the Cubans allowed the extremely unpopular amendment to their constitution. These 
historians and the political scientist Lars Schoultz acknowledge that the Cuban constitutional 
assembly at first refused the Platt Amendment and then tried to change its language. But both 
Secretary of War Elihu Root and Leonard Wood refused to budge and plainly told the 
assembly that unless they accepted the amendment in its entirety, the American occupation 
would continue. Schoultz notes that “seeing no alternative, the Cubans capitulated.”6 
Why did the Cubans have no alternative?  During the initial occupation of Cuba, the 
U.S. Army perfected a procedure where it controlled the province by garrisoning the towns, 
monopolized the collection and expenditure of the island’s tariff revenues, built the necessary 
infrastructure to sustain its garrisons, and disbanded the Cuban Liberation Army, thereby 
eliminating the only threat to its use of force. Within months of occupying the rest of Cuba 
the division and department commanders used these same methods to establish control and to 
compel the Cubans to accept U.S. policy. By 1901, the Cubans had long since lost their 
ability to seriously challenge the military government of the United States, and they were left 
with no other realistic choice but to accept the Platt Amendment in its entirety. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
guaranteed American economic and political hegemony.  For Similar views Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian 
Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2000). Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). For a dissenting view see David F. Healy, The United 
States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1963), who argues that the McKinley administration formulated the Platt Amendment as a pragmatic 
compromise to placate both the small but influential annexationist faction in the United States and Cuba, and 
the majority of Americans and Cubans who wanted to give Cuba its independence. 
6 Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 24. 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE FORMATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SANTIAGO 
 
Even before the U.S. Army could establish garrisons to control the Province of 
Santiago, it first had to create an organizational unit that fit within the Army’s existing 
administrative structure. To do this President McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. 
Alger established a military department in the Province of Santiago that was identical to one 
of the eight geographical departments within the continental United States and assigned it a 
commander. The commander’s authority extended over all the garrisons within the 
geographical boundaries of his department, and he ensured the implementation of the War 
Department’s orders and policies. Additionally, the department commander was responsible 
for the health, discipline, training, and supply of the troops under his command. To assist the 
commander in administering and supplying his subordinate units the War Department 
assigned staff officers from each of the Army’s ten staff bureaus—Adjutant General, 
Quartermaster, Commissary, Ordnance, Medical, etc. Finally, the War Department assigned 
regiments to the newly formed department in Santiago, Cuba. 
In early August 1898, the Secretary of War Alger and Adjutant General Henry C. 
Corbin began consulting with Shafter, commander of the 5th Corps. The group needed to 
identify an officer among those already in Cuba to command the forces arriving to garrison 
the area around Santiago surrendered by General José Toral on July 17. The War Department 
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sought to appoint one major general to command the soon to be created Department of 
Santiago and two brigadier generals to command the two brigades of soldiers they intended 
to send to garrison the province.7 The next day, Shafter cabled back to the War Department 
that he recommended Major General Lawton, commander of the Second Division of the 5th 
Corps, noting that Lawton “desires very much” to take command of the department.8 Shafter 
also reported that “General Wood is by far the best man to leave in command” of the city of 
Santiago de Cuba.9 Shafter also made a case for a third Brigadier General in the department, 
giving Wood command within the city, and then selecting two brigadier generals—either 
John D. Miley, Ezra P. Ewers, William Ludlow, or William H. Bisbee—to command four 
regiments of garrison troops each.10 After a week of deliberation, the Secretary of War and 
President created the Department of Santiago with Lawton in command. Shafter temporarily 
remained in Santiago to continue evacuating his corps, while Lawton took control of the 
garrison and the convalescents from Shafter’s command who were too ill to make the trip 
back to the United Sates. Listening to Shafter’s advice, the War Department kept Wood “in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 6, Official Correspondence relative to Santiago and Porto Rico 
Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 206. 
8 Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 6, Official Correspondence relative to Santiago and Porto Rico 
Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 204-205. See also 
Shafter to Corbin August 6, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
9 Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 6, Official Correspondence relative to Santiago and Porto Rico 
Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 210. See also Shafter to 
Corbin August 4, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
10 Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 6, Official Correspondence relative to Santiago and Porto Rico 
Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 204-205. See also 
Shafter to Corbin August 6, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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command of the city” and also assigned Ewers to the department, but it did not assign a third 
brigadier general to Lawton’s command.11 
Lawton emerged for many reasons as the first choice of McKinley and the War 
Department to command the Department of Santiago. First, as the 2nd Division Commander 
of the 5th Corps, Lawton repeatedly distinguished himself as a capable leader during the 
Santiago Campaign through his timely reinforcement of Major General Joseph Wheeler’s 
Cavalry Division at Las Guásimas and for his less than impressive but still victorious capture 
of El Caney against the most stubborn of the Spanish defenses. Second, he had remained 
healthy, while almost all other senior commanders succumbed to fever and dysentery during 
the campaign. Finally, Lawton was a regular officer with more than 32 years experience. 
Boasting a tall and slender figure, as well as a bristly mustache, he cut a swath as a typically 
charismatic general, yet he exuded humility—a characteristic severely lacking among his 
peers in Cuba.12 
Lawton’s distinguished military career had begun in 1861 when, at age 18, he left 
Fort Wayne Methodist Episcopal College to enlist in the 9th Indiana Infantry in the early days 
of the Civil War. He later earned a volunteer commission as a first lieutenant in the newly 
mustered 30th Indiana Infantry and fought in all the major battles of the Western Theater. 
During the Battle of Atlanta, Lawton led a company of men in the seizure of a Confederate 
trench and then held the field fortifications against two determined counterattacks, receiving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 6, Official Correspondence relative to Santiago and Porto Rico 
Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 218. See also, National 
Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1504, Annual Report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U.S. Volunteers, 
Commanding Department of Santiago, 1899, 1.  See also, Annual Report Adjutant General of the Army to the 
Secretary of War 1898, Folder 5, Container 2, Henry Clark Corbin papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 
12 Timeline, The Papers of Henry W. Lawton, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
	   12	  
the Medal of Honor for his gallantry. After finishing the war as a lieutenant colonel of 
volunteers, Lawton entered Harvard Law School. In 1867, based on the glowing 
recommendations of his commanders during the Civil War, he garnered a congressional 
commission as a second lieutenant in the newly expanded regular Army where, for the next 
25 years, he fought in Indian War campaigns against the Kickapoo, Cheyenne, Sioux, 
Comanche, and Ute. Most famously, in 1886 while only a captain, Lawton led a relentless 
pursuit of Geronimo and his Chiricahua Apache band across southeastern Arizona and into 
northern Sonora, resulting in Geronimo’s surrender. Despite his reputation as a fierce Indian 
fighter, his superiors, the press, and his former Indian enemies all commented on Lawton’s 
compassion towards his former enemies, as he ensured they received fair treatment after 
capitulating. After his promotion to major in the regular Army in 1888, Lawton spent the 
next decade as an inspector general learning the intricacies of the Army’s administration and 
Washington D.C. politics. Lessons in diplomacy and administration learned on the frontier 
and in the nation’s capital served Lawton well as he took over command of the Department 
of Santiago after Shafter’s departure.13 
Assuming command on August 14, 1898, Lawton faced his first critical challenge: he 
had practically no staff.14 In 1898, ten staff bureaus handled all the Army’s administrative 
and supply needs. At the head of each staff bureau sat a brigadier general who assigned 
subordinates to the large field commands and geographical administrative departments to 
provide necessary support. Without a staff, Lawton had no way to communicate, receive 
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of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
14 Leonard Wood Papers, General Orders and Circulars, Department of Santiago, 1898, G. O. 1, August 14, 
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orders, or make requisitions with the War Department bureaucracy in Washington. 
Moreover, he could not manage the military government or administer humanitarian relief. 
For example, the Adjutant General issued all official orders and coordinated the actions of 
the others staff officers to meet the commander’s intent. In the ensuing occupation, the 
Adjutant General of the department also issued and published civil orders and laws, and he 
synchronized the different bureaucratic offices in the military government. Similarly, the 
Chief Commissary officer of the department not only requisitioned and issued rations to the 
soldiers, but also assumed the responsibility of distributing relief rations to destitute 
Cubans.15 
After assuming command, Lawton continued to use the staff officers of his division. 
Unfortunately, the experienced and long-serving regular officers suffered from the same 
fevers and illnesses that plagued the rest of the invading army. On August 15, Lawton 
urgently wrote Adjutant General Corbin in Washington requesting an entirely new staff, 
stating that all of his “old staff [are] sick and not capable of further service here.”16 Less than 
a week later, Lawton repeated his request, noting that even “under most favorable conditions 
the administration of the Department would be difficult and trying,” and that therefore, “only 
able experienced and trustworthy staff officers should be sent me. It would be worse than 
folly to select them from the command now with me if untried officers of the volunteer 
staff.”17 Because the health of the U.S. Army in Santiago was the War Department’s top 
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16 Lawton to Corbin, August 15, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1479, Vol. 1 of 8, August 
15, 1898 to October 4, 1898, 1.  
17 Lawton to Corbin, August 21, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1479, Vol. 1 of 8, August 
15, 1898 to October 4, 1898, 33. 
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priority, Corbin allowed Lawton to select the best officers from the 5th Corps to remain as his 
staff, urging him to “ask for anything you need it will be given you.”18 Corbin immediately 
assigned the most senior staff officers currently in Santiago de Cuba to Lawton’s staff, each 
with decades of experience administering the frontier army of the United States. During the 
next month Corbin and Lawton worked together to locate permanent replacements.19 This 
sensible solution allowed Lawton and his staff to effectively administer the Department of 
Santiago until Corbin sent replacement staff officers. 
Although key staff officers continued to come and go from the Department of 
Santiago throughout the initial occupation, by October 4, most of the permanent officers had 
arrived. In almost every case these officers had years of experience serving at isolated posts 
on the American frontier. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Beacom, a West Point graduate from 
the class of 1882 who commanded a company of Native American soldiers in the Dakotas 
and accompanied the British expedition to the Sudan as an observer, took over as the 
Adjutant General of the department.20 His capable assistant, Captain R. G. Mendoza, was a 
volunteer who spoke Spanish fluently and was born in Cuba.21 Chief Ordnance Officer 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry D. Borup graduated from West Point in 1876 and received orders 
to the 2nd Artillery at Fort Reno in Indian Territory. After subsequent frontier duty based in 
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20 Obituary, New York Evening Post, September 23, 1916. 
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San Antonio, Borup passed the Ordnance Examining Board in 1879.22 On 19 September, 
Major George T. Bartlett, commissioned in 1881 from West Point as an artillery officer, 
arrived in Santiago de Cuba to relieve the exhausted Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Osgood as 
Chief Commissary of Subsistence.23 
Similarly, on October 3, Corbin replaced Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Jacobs, who as a 
lieutenant served as a quartermaster in Brigadier General John Gibbon’s Montana Column 
during the 1876 Sioux campaign, with Major John T. Knight as the Santiago Department’s 
Chief Quartermaster.24 Corbin allowed Lawton to keep as his chief surgeon Lieutenant 
Colonel Valery Havard, a New York University’s medical school graduate. In 1871 Havard 
joined the U.S. Army as an acting assistant surgeon. Before landing at Siboney with Shafter’s 
invasion force, he accompanied expeditions to fight the Sioux and Nez Perce and explore 
western Texas. Other new staff officers included Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Ribbel as 
Judge Advocate, Major Robert S. Smith as Chief Paymaster, Charles G. Starr as Inspector 
General, and Jasper E. Brady Jr. as Chief Signal Officer.25 
As Lawton’s staff transformed into an efficient administrative organization, he 
suddenly left—ostensibly due to illness. This story appeared plausible to the American 
public, given the high rate of disease among American soldiers in Cuba; however, the only 
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sickness this popular general suffered was from alcoholism. In late September, Lawton went 
on a weeklong drinking binge and, in the process, ransacked a bar and assaulted the police 
chief in Santiago de Cuba. A reporter for the pro-administration New York Evening Sun sent 
the story of Lawton’s abuses to his editor William Laffan, who did not publish it and 
confidentially notified President McKinley. This earned Laffan McKinley’s lasting gratitude. 
Hardly needing another scandal in Santiago, McKinley relieved Lawton by giving him a 
“confidential leave of absence on account of sickness, for sixty days” on the same day 
McKinley received Laffan’s letter. He replaced Lawton with his former personal doctor, 
Brigadier General Leonard Wood.26 On October 7, Corbin notified Wood that “during the 
absence of General Lawton, on sick leave, you are by direction of the President assigned to 
the command of the Department of Santiago.”27 Three days later, Wood assumed command, 
and Lawton left for Washington to recover not from illness, but from a tarnished reputation.28 
During his brief tenure, Lawton did much to bring order and stability to the 
Department of Santiago. He repaired the fractured relationship with the Cuban generals, 
becoming close with Calixito García. He supervised the successful withdraw of the 5th Corps 
and the Spanish prisoners, and set the foundation for the reestablishment of civil government. 
The Spanish merchant Antonio Battles spoke for many of his peers and high-ranking officials 
when he wrote to Lawton that the Spanish element lamented his departure “because we 
looked to you as a worthy governor, a true friend, a lover of peace and good order, and a firm 
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protector of the working class.”29 While Lawton strictly adhered to the President’s guidance, 
asserted his control over the department, and maintained order, he simply could not control 
his excessive drinking. 
Lawton’s replacement, Wood, owed his new high position to high energy, good 
fortune, and, perhaps most importantly, his ruthless pursuit of promotion through carefully 
cultivated political relationships. After graduating from Harvard Medical School in 1884, 
Wood joined the Army as a surgeon and spent his first decade on the western frontier.  Soon 
after his arrival, Wood earned the Medal of Honor for bravery during an expedition with his 
first commander, then Captain Henry W. Lawton, chasing Geronimo. In 1895, after using his 
influence to get to Washington, the young surgeon attended to President Cleveland and 
cabinet members before becoming the personal physician for the new president’s invalid 
wife, Ida Saxton McKinley. While in Washington, Wood formed close relationships with 
territorial expansionists, such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and publisher Whitelaw Reid. 
His closest and most important friendship, however, was with Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Theodore Roosevelt. During long hikes and hunting trips, the two became close 
friends, and Wood soon embraced Roosevelt’s expansionist ideas. When war with Spain 
broke out in 1898, Roosevelt and Wood used their close relationship with Alger and Lodge to 
maneuver Wood into the command of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, known as the Rough Riders. 
Roosevelt became the lieutenant colonel of the regiment. In Cuba the Rough Riders were 
under the command of Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young, who fell ill with malarial 
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fever after the fight at Las Guásimas. Wood took command of the brigade, moving Roosevelt 
into command of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry in time for the fight on San Juan and Kettle Hill.30 
Three days after the Spanish surrender, Shafter needed someone to administer the city 
of Santiago de Cuba. With approximately a hundred civilians dying every day from disease 
and starvation, Wood, a proven leader and still technically an Army surgeon, seemed the 
natural choice to sanitize the city and restore order. Also, unlike many of the other senior 
regulars officers in Santiago who despised Shafter, Wood kept his criticisms of Shafter 
private.31 
Wood’s rapid promotion to Brigadier General of Volunteers and appointment as 
commander of Santiago de Cuba angered these same long-serving regulars and West Point 
graduates who despised Shafter for his obesity, mismanagement of the campaign, and his 
membership in the anti-West Point clique of Civil War volunteer generals. These regular 
officers who had waited years, if not decades, for promotions based on seniority detested 
Wood’s rapid promotion, which they rightly accredited to his political connections. First 
Lieutenant J. H. Reeves, who as General Samuel B. M. Young’s aid-de-camp kept a journal 
for the general at his request and who worked closely with Wood during the Santiago 
campaign, best described Young’s and other senior regular officer’s sentiments towards the 
young Wood. Reeves wrote that “Wood is in a certain way a good man, extremely energetic 
and all that, but he is now beyond his proper limit and talks a great deal and does nothing.”32 
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Wood continued to use his political connections to advance his cause once he 
assumed command of the Department of Santiago. He maintained a regular correspondence 
with Alger, Roosevelt, and Lodge. All three assured Wood that they praised him in front of 
the President and showed McKinley the general’s letters.33 Even more scrupulously, Wood 
employed an agent named A. E. Mestre in New York who had Mr. William McCloy write an 
article for the New York Evening Sun on Wood’s suitability to be the Military Governor of 
Cuba. Mestre also wrote a personal appeal to McKinley with the same objective in mind.34 
By early December, Wood’s persistence paid off when he received word from the president’s 
personal secretary, J. A. Porter, and Lodge of his nomination for promotion to Major General 
of Volunteers. Within a year Wood replaced Brooke as the Military Governor of Cuba.35 
Wood also served an important purpose for his powerful political patrons. For 
instance, Lodge wrote to Wood about how he invoked Wood’s success in Santiago in his 
campaign speeches. Lodge attributed Wood’s popularity as a major contributing factor in 
bringing about the “great Republican victory, something very remarkable for a mid year” 
election, including the election of Wood’s friend Roosevelt as the governor of New York and 
a 15 seat majority in the U.S. Senate.36 As long as Wood maintained order and control over 
the Department of Santiago, garnering popular support for the Republican administration, his 
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friends in Washington would continue to reward him with further promotions and higher 
positions. All Wood had to do was concentrate on controlling and bringing order to the 
province. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
BRINGING ORDER TO SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND ENDING THE STATE OF WAR 
 
Four days after the Spanish surrender, General Young’s aid, Lieutenant Reeves 
commented on the utter chaos in the city of Santiago de Cuba. Thousands of sick and 
starving refugees returned to the city, and an uneasy peace existed between the fearful 
Spanish, the cautious Americans, and the eager Cubans. Reeves warned that more soldiers 
were required to ensure order in the city.37 By July 23, Reeves noted in his diary that the city 
was “orderly considering the conditions and business [was] resuming” with the increased 
presence of U.S. soldiers. However, he urged that the U.S. Army “must occupy the territory 
we have conquered and not leave it in absolute chaos, and this can only be done by our 
soldiers.”38 
Reeves’s sentiments on the method required to bring order to the chaotic situation 
matched both those of the senior commanders on the ground in Santiago and the decision 
makers in the War Department. The Department’s preferred strategy for controlling local 
populations and enforcing U.S. policies on the American frontier had long been to establish 
garrisons, and the U.S. Army did not deviate from its institutional methods in Santiago. 
When Corbin asked Shafter how many troops would be required to maintain order in the 
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province, Shafter replied that “a battalion of four companies is sufficient for any” town, 
“except Santiago. The presence of troops will be sufficient to preserve order.”39 Shafter 
justified his relatively “small estimate” by explaining that “all the [Spanish] guerrillas are 
disarmed, and the only fear that the people apprehend is from the [Cuban] insurgents, and 
they (the insurgents) assure me that they will not interfere with any of them, though in many 
cases this promise will not be kept from inability to control the men.”40 Clearly, the only 
serious threat that concerned Shafter was from Cuban soldiers challenging his authority. As 
long as the “insurgent” leaders controlled their men, or as long as the Cuban soldiers feared 
the strength of the U.S. Army, then Shafter expected that the mere threat of force alone 
would be sufficient to maintain order in the province, enforce U.S. policy, and keep the peace 
between the Spanish loyalists in Cuba and their bitter Cuban enemies. 
Reeves chastised those officers who were so eager to leave and who did not realize 
the difficulty of occupying the province and the “size of the job we have on our hands.”41 
The exhausted 5th Corps, as is so often the case with armies after the fighting ends, showed 
little interest in the work of administering the recently surrendered province. The War 
Department understood that, given the mental and physical condition of the soldiers and 
officers of the 5th Corps, they could not be expected to garrison the province. Because the 5th 
Corps suffered extensively from malaria and yellow fever, the War Department issued orders 
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for five of the ten “immune” regiments to relieve the 5th Corps. On May 10, 1898, at the 
request of the War Department, Congress authorized the enlistment of 10,000 soldiers, whose 
prior exposure to tropical diseases allegedly made them immune to reinfection. These newly 
recruited soldiers were to be mustered into ten regiments of United States Volunteer Infantry, 
U.S.V.I., or more commonly known as immunes.42 The 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Immune 
Regiments arrived in August 1898 to replace the 5th Corps. The 4th U.S.V.I. did not arrive 
until October 12. The 9th U.S.V.I. differed from the other immune regiments sent to Santiago 
because it consisted of black soldiers and lieutenants with white senior officers, whereas all 
of the members of the other immune regiments were white. In addition to the five immune 
regiments, the War Department, under pressure from black Republican constituents, ordered 
the 8th Illinois Infantry and 23rd Kansas Infantry to Santiago. African Americans completely 
manned and led these Regiments, and the War Department incorrectly hoped that these black 
soldiers would resist the diseases in the tropical climate better than their predecessors had.43 
After the first two immune regiments to arrive showed ill discipline in Santiago de 
Cuba, the embarrassed Shafter requested the War Department send Lawton at least one 
regiment of regulars to garrison the city. The War Department, eager to avoid additional 
negative press, dispatched two battalions from the 5th U.S. Infantry, not to be confused with 
the immunes of the 5th U.S.V.I.44 The War Department thought that seven of the eight 
regiments chosen to garrison the Province of Santiago had at least some immunity to tropical 
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diseases. Based on the two partially correct notions in the late-19th century medical 
community that African Americans were resistant to malaria and other fevers and that people 
in the southeastern United States who had previously suffered from malaria and yellow fever 
were immune to reinfection, Corbin picked the units he thought best suited to relieve the 5th 
Corps. 
On arriving in Santiago de Cuba, these replacement regiments took over 
responsibility for maintaining order in the city and guarding the Spanish prisoners. Colonel 
Duncan N. Hood’s 2nd U.S.V.I. arrived first to Santiago de Cuba on August 2. Hood, the son 
of the Confederate General John B. Hood, recruited his regiments of immunes out of 
Louisiana and eastern Texas.45 After disembarking, the 2nd Immunes marched to the Parque 
Alameda promenade in the heart of Santiago de Cuba’s harbor and made camp.46 There, it 
replaced the 9th U.S. Infantry, patrolling the city center “in the preservation of order and 
protection of life and property.”47 Colonel H. H. Sargent’ 5th Immunes arrived next on 
August 12. Wood, now in command of the two replacement regiments in the city, ordered the 
5th U.S.V.I. to act “in conjunction with the 2nd U.S. Volunteer Infantry in preserving order 
during the withdrawal of the 5th Army Corps.”48 A notable moment occurred on August 18 
when the 8th Illinois Infantry landed in Santiago de Cuba. For the first time in American 
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history, a regiment completely manned and officered by African Americans deployed 
overseas. On arrival, the 8th Illinois’s Colonel John R. Marshall received written guidance 
that his duties were to “preserve the peace, maintain order and protect lives and property of 
individuals.”49 
While these three regiments maintained order in Santiago de Cuba, two other 
regiments of immunes that arrived in mid-August relieved the regiments guarding the 
Spanish prisoners and secured the abandoned camps of the 5th Corps and the supplies that 
were strewn across the deserted battlefield.50 These two immune regiments consisted of 
Colonel Patrick H. Ray’s 3rd U.S.V.I., recruited from Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, 
and Colonel J. Crane’s 9th U.S.V.I. of African American soldiers and lieutenants.51 Both 
regimental commanders fought extensively in the Indian Wars. Ray maintained the peace and 
represented U.S. authority in the Alaskan Territory, while Crane did the same on the 
Mexican border and with disgruntled Mormon settlers in Utah.52 The 3rd U.S.V.I. also sent a 
company to Siboney, the site of the first U.S. landings in June to relieve the 24th U.S. 
Infantry that was guarding the yellow fever hospital and the large stores still sitting on the 
landing beach.53 At the end of August, the two battalions of regulars from the 5th Infantry 
arrived, but Lawton quarantined the battalions because some of the soldiers had yellow 
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fever.54 After their quarantine, these more disciplined regulars replaced the unruly 2nd 
U.S.V.I. in garrisoning Santiago de Cuba.55 
In early August, as the first replacement regiments arrived and the 5th Corps began to 
depart for Montauk Point, the United States and Spain had yet to sign an armistice. Most of 
the members of the 5th Corps believed that after spending the remainder of the summer 
recuperating at Camp Wikoff they would return to Cuba in the dry season and seize 
Havana.56 This all changed when news arrived on August 12 that the President had signed the 
Peace Protocol between Spain and the United States, officially ending hostilities until a peace 
commission from the two countries could meet in Paris to negotiate the full details of the 
treaty. The War Department immediately forwarded the full text of the protocol and expected 
the generals in Santiago to begin implementing the agreement, yet the generals received no 
specific guidance on how to implement it. The text of the agreement made it clear to Shafter 
and Lawton that Spain was to “relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.”57 
These generals and the War Department also understood that the Teller Amendment that was 
added to the joint resolution of Congress for declaring war on Spain ensured Cuban 
independence after pacification of the island. But the commanders did not receive any 
specific plan from the McKinley administration for when, how, or even if this transfer to 
Cuban sovereignty would take place. Only the sixth clause of the protocol, which 
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immediately suspended hostiles, gave the commanders in Santiago a clear directive to 
enforce.58 
Lawton immediately took calculated steps and used symbolic gestures to signal the 
end of hostilities in the Department of Santiago. For example, on August 24 he noted that “as 
the state or condition of war no longer exists, and as there is no armed enemy in this vicinity, 
the necessity of carrying arms as a measure of self-protection has passed away.” 
Furthermore, he ordered that no soldiers could carry weapons unless on official duty, and 
even sentries could not carry loaded weapons unless an officer deemed it necessary.59 
Lawton clearly sought to create a climate of stability and peace, rather than one of war or 
hostile occupation. This purpose is evident in his September 2 order to Wood to remove all 
the sentries he had placed on the street corners in Santiago, writing that they could only 
guard public property.60 On the same day, Lawton ordered Crane, of the 9th U.S.V.I., to 
investigate a report that a detail of his soldiers confiscated a machete from a Cuban laborer. 
If the charges of an unlawful seizure were true, Lawton insisted that Crane prefer charges 
“against each and all of them.”61 Lawton, a professional officer for more than 35 years, 
strictly adhered to McKinley’s instructions to end the state of hostilities by making it illegal 
for soldiers to confiscate personal weapons or property.62 
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Besides removing visible signs of war and occupation, Lawton knew from experience 
that one key way to prevent disorder in the department was to keep armed people of any 
nationality out of the cities and towns so the local police and sentries could maintain law and 
order without armed opposition. The largest threat to order and stability in Santiago de Cuba 
after the Spanish surrender came not from the Cubans or Spanish, but from the ill disciplined 
and recently arrived men in the 2nd U.S.V.I., who became inebriated and indiscriminately 
fired their weapons in the city. These acts “mortified and embarrassed” Lawton and forced 
him to use “every possible lawful means … to maintain order” by confining those 
responsible.63 It is no coincidence that Lawton enacted his ban on U.S. soldiers carrying arms 
in the city only days after the incident with the 2nd U.S.V.I (Immunes). 
Drunken off-duty U.S. soldiers were not the only armed group that Lawton targeted 
with his August 24 order. His order also reconfirmed Shafter’s contentious decision of July 
14, which prevented the Cuban soldiers, who carried the entire burden of fighting the Spanish 
for three years before the arrival of the U.S. Army, from entering the city armed, 
participating in the surrender ceremonies, or administering the city. Rightly insulted by 
Shafter’s decision, Calixito García marched his 5,000 Cuban soldiers north of the city, and 
offered his resignation to General Máximo Gómez. Shafter’s, and later Lawton’s, decision to 
keep armed Cuban soldiers out of the towns controlled by the U.S. Army, denying them local 
self-determination after three years of fighting, created deep animosity that persists to this 
day.64 
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Why did the uncompromising Shafter and the more diplomatic Lawton choose to 
alienate their Cuban allies? They acted in response to President McKinley’s specific 
guidance and an obsession with order and stability deeply imbedded within the U.S. Army’s 
institutional culture. The day after the Spanish surrender the president proclaimed that in the 
Province of Santiago as “conquered territory” and the “powers of the military occupation are 
absolute and supreme and immediately operate on the political condition of the inhabitants.” 
He then declared, “severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the 
establishment of a new political power.” Additionally, the President made clear that the U.S. 
Army’s primary mission was to protect the rights and property of all the inhabitants of Cuba, 
including the wealthy Spanish merchants and European and American plantation owners who 
feared retaliatory attacks after three years of bitter war. Finally, McKinley ordered that the 
“municipal laws…judges, and constabulary” [remain] in force.”65 The President’s clear 
mandate combined with the fact that the President and the War Department consciously 
denied the Cuban Liberation Army or the Cuban provisional government anything 
resembling formal recognition, gave Shafter and then Lawton no other choice but to exclude 
armed members of the Cuban Liberation Army from entering Santiago de Cuba, and to use 
the preexisting municipal government and their own forces to maintain order and administer 
the city. 
In addition to removing both armed Cuban soldiers and armed off-duty American 
soldiers from the streets of Santiago de Cuba, the military administration made other 
symbolic gestures to mark the severance of Spanish authority and the “establishment of a 
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new political power.” Symbols representing the Spanish monarchy were removed from 
official documents and from the facades of the building. 66 For example, Wood ordered the 
Spanish coat of arms that adorned the governor’s palace and other public buildings in 
Santiago to be taken down and replaced with the shield of the United States.67 Earlier, to 
signify the new political order, Lawton ordered the U.S. flag flown at all “buildings occupied 
for official purpose, either military, civil or municipal, throughout the department.”68 
Conscious of McKinley’s order “not to make war on the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any 
faction of them, but to protect their personal…rights,” Lawton did not consider removing the 
Cuban flags that adorned most private residences and nongovernmental buildings, such as 
private clubs in Santiago de Cuba.69 
Besides installing symbols of Cuban national identity, or Cubanía, the Cubans also 
sought to celebrate significant days in Cuban history. In October 1898, more than 10,000 
Cubans gathered in Santiago de Cuba’s central plaza to commemorate the “Grito de Yara,” 
which marked the moment when Carlos Manuel de Céspedes first declared Cuban 
independence in the town of Yara in Santiago Province, starting the Ten Years’ War (1868-
1878). Despite the fact that Wood prohibited the Cubans’ petition to hold their first large-
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scale celebration of a Cuban national hero, the Cubans held the celebration anyway.70 Instead 
of suppressing the Cubans first act of national agency, Wood took steps to control it. He 
permitted the Cubans to give several speeches from the “portico of the San Carlos Club,” so 
long as they spoke glowingly of the American administration.71 In one speech, General 
Calixito García, “cautioned the people not to be led astray by demagogues, and declared that 
the Americans meant to guarantee a stable government in Cuba, to restore industry, and to 
protect lives and property.”72 To prevent disorder and dissention, Wood placed companies of 
the 5th Regulars and the 5th Immunes in view of the celebration. He used these troops to clear 
a group of anti-American Cuban soldiers from a drinking establishment where they were 
“indulging in incendiary talk.”73 The American soldiers removed the Cuban dissenters 
without major incident, because Wood maintained his monopoly of military force within the 
city by continuing to prohibit Cuban soldiers from carrying arms, even during the large 
parade of Cuban Clubs and soldiers that took place in the city on October 17. 
While Wood maintained the force necessary to preserve order in the city of Santiago 
de Cuba and could demonstrate U.S. supremacy by placing symbols on public buildings, the 
McKinley administration’s strict guidance to preserve individual rights prevented him from 
suppressing the peaceful march of the Cuban clubs and soldiers or the decorating of the 
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streets and private establishments with Cuban flags and nationalistic decorations.74 Shafter, 
Lawton, and Wood never received explicit guidance from McKinley or the War Department 
on the long-term U.S. policy towards Cuba during the initial occupation, probably because 
the politically cautious and pragmatic President was still measuring Cuban and American 
public opinion before taking any definitive action. Nonetheless, his short-term guidance to 
his commanders was clear: they were to maintain order, protect individual and property 
rights, establish the rule of law, and end the state of war in the department. As long as the 
Cuban Liberation Army remained mobilized, however, the series of department commanders 
could not guarantee long-term stability or uncontested American supremacy in Santiago. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NEUTRALIZING THE CUBAN “INSURGENTS” 
 
American supremacy in the Department of Santiago depended on the Cuban 
Liberation Army’s acquiescence to U.S. authority. Cuban soldiers could have fought the 
occupying U.S. Army for immediate control of their affairs and made the occupation of 
eastern Cuba as untenable as it had been for the Spanish army, but there was no reason for 
the Cubans to resist the U.S. initial occupation in 1898. Exhausted, starving, and desperate to 
end the last in a series of three bloody wars of independence from Spain, the Cubans knew 
that the Teller Amendment guaranteed their independence. And in 1898, the Cubans still 
believed that the United States would honor its commitment to Cuban independence and 
leave quickly. Similarly, the Spanish merchants and foreign landholders had no reason to 
resist the American occupation because it guaranteed the protection of their property and the 
maintenance or order necessary to resume economic activity. The American soldiers, 
officers, and press understood within months of occupying Santiago that the majority of 
Cubans were “in favor of the immediate evacuation of the island by the Americans and the 
establishment of a Cuban republic.”75 The War Department and the American commanders 
in Santiago thus immediately sought to neutralize and disband the Cuban Liberation Army in 
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order to eliminate the only threat to its ability to dictate the policy and pace of the 
occupation. 
Outside every Spanish-occupied town and village in the Province of Santiago, 
soldiers of the Cuban Liberation Army, also known as mambises, camped just a few hundred 
yards away from the Spanish pickets. These local mambises waited impatiently for the 
Spanish soldiers to depart for Spain under the terms of the Treaty of Paris so they could 
establish their own municipal governments, achieving one of the major objectives of the 
1895 Cuban War of Independence. But time was not on the mambises’ side. The Cuban 
Liberation Army soldiers and their families suffered severe shortages of supplies, food, and 
clothing. During the Cuban War of Independence, the mambises provided for themselves by 
foraging and stealing food, while their families were caught between two equally unfortunate 
options: either face disease and possible starvation as reconcentrados in Spanish 
concentration camps or risk the same possible fate hiding out in the countryside from often-
vengeful Spanish patrols. With the cessation of hostilities, Cuban soldiers and their families 
eagerly awaited the opportunity to return to their communities and assert their claim to local 
governance. Wealthier Spanish merchants and shop owners in the towns and villages, 
however, feared reprisals and chaos, which they assumed would ensue if the Cubans dictated 
the terms of the new municipal governments. The U.S. Army sought to maintain peace 
between these two factions, as well as to ally with the members of each party who shared 
similar political views with the McKinley’s administration. 
Throughout the initial occupation, the relationship between the U.S. Army and the 
Cuban Liberation Army ranged from friendly to extremely tense. To alleviate hostile 
feelings, the American commanders worked with conservative Cuban officers in order to 
	   35	  
convince this faction to disband their formations of soldiers. In return for their cooperation, 
the Americans offered these Cuban officers lucrative positions in local government and gave 
their disbanded soldiers rations and public works jobs. Wood succinctly summarized his 
policy toward the Cuban Liberation Army in a letter to the President at the end of the initial 
occupation. His simple plan to deal with the mambises was “getting them to disband, getting 
them to work, and impressing upon them the necessity of recognizing the absolute authority 
of civil law.”76 
Yet in the immediate days and weeks following the Spanish surrender of the city of 
Santiago de Cuba, the U.S. Army acted more cautiously toward the Cuban “insurgents,” as 
the Americans called them, and for good reason: it respected the Cuban Liberation Army’s 
military capabilities. For three years, Cuban armies controlled most of eastern Cuba. They 
kept the Spanish forces there confined to fortified towns and cities and restricted their inland 
movements. While the Cuban Liberation Army rarely took and held any important 
population center or defeated a large Spanish field Army, the mambises excelled in guerrilla 
tactics. Their ambushes and raids prevented the Spanish from dispersing sufficient troops to 
control the smaller towns and from moving units or supplies through the countryside except 
when marching with overwhelming force or along a few fortified lines of communications 
known as trochas. 
Lawton and Wood knew that if the Cuban Liberation Army contested the U.S. 
occupation, they would soon confront the same dilemma that Spain had faced, and they 
might find themselves forced to fight a similarly costly war requiring a huge field army. At 
the time of the Spanish surrender, Wood estimated the Cuban Liberation Army consisted of 
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11,000 soldiers in the Province of Santiago; of these, about 5,000 were in vicinity of the city 
of Santiago de Cuba.77 The veteran 5th Corps, concentrated around the city, greatly 
outnumbered the Cuban soldiers and maintained a tremendous superiority in machine guns 
and artillery. Also, their Krag-Jorgenson rifles were roughly equivalent to the Spanish 
Mauser rifles that most Cubans carried. Once the War Department replaced the 5th Corps 
with volunteers, the balance shifted.  Fewer than 8,000 recently mustered volunteer soldiers 
made up all but one of the regiments sent to garrison the Department of Santiago. With the 
exception of the 5th U.S. Regulars, these soldiers carried the inferior Springfield rifle and 
brought almost no artillery. Private Mack H. Brinkley of the 3rd U.S.V.I. remembered fearing 
both the Mauser, which “shot 5 times to our one,” and the Cuban three-foot long machete 
that was “as sharp as a razor.”78 With superior weaponry and numbers, and by using irregular 
tactics, the Cuban Liberation Army might have challenged the occupation forces for control 
of Santiago Province. 
War Department officials and the commanders in Santiago did not just fear the Cuban 
Liberation Army’s military potential; they also worried that the desperate situation of its 
soldiers might force them to commit acts of violence out of pure necessity. The Chief 
Commissary in Santiago, Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Osgood, noted that the thousands of 
Cuban soldiers still armed in the department were “observing [the] law while their families 
are naked and starving. It is asking too much of human nature to expect its continuance.”79 
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Unless the soldiers and their families received food, jobs, and farming tools, Osgood 
explained, the Cuban soldiers might be forced to violence. He believed that giving aid to 
these Cubans was wiser in the long run than using “expensive force to repress it.”80 The 5th 
Corps commander, Shafter, concurred. Observing that “there is nothing for men to do in the 
country” as “it has absolutely returned to its wild state,” Shafter reasoned that because the 
Cubans soldiers “show no disposition to disband and go to work, and until they do there will 
be trouble, for they have got to live, and they will have to live by robbery— there is no other 
way.”81 Shafter also warned that “A dual government can’t exist here; we have got to have 
full sway over the Cubans…as war is no longer possible to them except with ourselves.”82 
Both Shafter and Osgood believed that the lack of employment opportunities and the 
devastation to the farmland inhibited Cuban soldiers from returning to work and giving up 
their arms. They urged the McKinley administration to formulate a specific policy for 
handling the Cuban Liberation Army, because the Army clearly lacked the capacity to 
implement American policy freely while an armed Cuban force asserted its right to dictate at 
least some of the policy decisions in the occupied province. 
Shafter feared more than Cuban soldiers’ lack of opportunities. He also thought that 
Cuban generals might be scheming to challenge U.S. authority by taking control of the towns 
outside of the city of Santiago de Cuba and then refusing to yield them to the U.S. military 
authorities. On August 17, he read in the local newspapers that Gómez, the commander-in-
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chief of the Cuban Liberation Army, and García departed for the town of Cobre, 4 miles from 
Santiago de Cuba, and issued orders for the Cuban Soldiers to meet him there. Shafter 
warned Corbin that “the assemblage of such a force may lead to complications of a grave 
character.”83 Before he departed for Santiago, Shafter received permission from the War 
Department to work with “any of the insurgent forces in the area,” but the Commanding 
General of the Army, Nelson A. Miles, cautioned him not to put “too much confidence in and 
persons outside your forces.”84 
Shafter’s racial prejudices toward the Cubans blinded him from recognizing the 
valuable assistance the Cuban Army provided to his forces by isolating the city, preventing it 
from being reinforced by other Spanish garrisons, and in scouting, providing guides, and 
performing other auxiliary work for the U.S. Army. Despite his racial prejudices against the 
Cubans, Shafter sincerely believed that if he did not keep the Spanish and Cubans separated a 
massacre might ensue. He became convinced of this after numerous conversations with both 
surrendering Spanish officers and wealthy Spanish-born citizens, and after receiving 
numerous reports concerning Cuban maltreatment of the Spanish.85 For all these reasons, and 
because of the War Department’s specifically ordered him to avoid recognizing the 
insurgents or any so-called Cuban government, Shafter angered the Cuban soldiers by 
keeping them out of the city of Santiago de Cuba. As Shafter explained, he made the Cuban 
soldiers “very sore because they were not permitted to take part in the conference leading to 
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the capitulation and because I will not permit them to go into the city armed.”86 He 
continued: “they expected and claim as their right to take possession of the city and control 
affairs.”87 The Cubans’ claim was justified, but given Shafter’s orders, prejudices, and fears, 
impossible for him to permit. 
On August 14, 1898 Lawton assumed command of the Department of Santiago, and 
the problem of disbanding the Cuban Liberation Army without starting another insurgency 
became one of his biggest concerns. Only two days after taking command, he urgently sought 
firm policy guidance. “These people still maintain their organization, are scattered through 
the country in vicinity of city, are threatening in their attitude, and keep the inhabitants 
stirred up and panicky by threats and acts of violence.”88 Only three hours later, Corbin 
replied that the President and Secretary of War ordered him not to tolerate hostile acts from 
the Cubans or anyone else. Lawton, they wrote, was “responsible for peace, and must 
maintain order in the territory surrendered and in your department, and must protect all 
persons and their property within said jurisdiction.” The War Department urged Lawton to 
treat the “Cuban insurgents…justly and liberally,” but made it abundantly clear that 
“interference from any quarter will not be permitted,” and that the Cuban Liberation Army 
“must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation 
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of hostilities.”89 Lawton now had the authority he required to assert U.S. Army control over 
the Cuban Liberation Army. According to his instructions from Washington the Cuban 
insurgents were not an allied army, but instead were simply armed Cuban civilians whose 
personal rights should be protected. 
Lawton did not act aggressively or hastily against the Cuban forces. Instead, the wise 
diplomat with decades of experience on the American frontier cooperated with the Cuban 
generals and slowly established his authority over the Cuban forces in Santiago Province. 
The day after he received the policy guidance, Lawton sent his aide, the Spanish-speaking 
Captain R. G. Mendoza, to deliver a copy of the telegraph to the local Cuban Army 
commander, General Demetrio Castillo. The War Department’s policy might have inflamed 
tensions between the two sides, but the language in Lawton’s cover letter was conciliatory 
and humble.90 Rather than assert supremacy of the U.S. Army over Cuban internal affairs and 
its armed forces, as the administration directed, Lawton asked to meet Castillo so they could 
“work together and in harmony for the mutual interest of Cuba and the United States.”91 
Lawton also sought Castillo’s advice on local affairs and added that if Castillo needed 
anything from him “personally or otherwise” to “please command me.”92 Lawton’s sincere 
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effort to include the Cuban officers in his administration and his friendly attitude enabled him 
to diffuse some of the tension between the Cuban and American armies. 
Besides using diplomacy, Lawton also capitalized on the Cuban Liberation Army’s 
desperate need for food and basic supplies to compel the mambises to disarm and return them 
to civilian pursuits. On September 3, Lawton received a note from Cuban Lieutenant Colonel 
M. Belanzo desperately requesting food for Cuban soldiers in the towns of Dos Caminos and 
El Cobre. Because Army regulations prevented anyone from giving away government 
property, including food, without approval from the War Department, Lawton asked Corbin 
for permission to distribute rations to these “insurgents, called Cuban Army.”93 Lawton 
placed some of the blame for the Cuban soldiers’ destitution squarely on their very existence 
as a concentrated military organization, telling Corbin that the Cuban soldiers “could soon, if 
disbanded secure work and become self supporting.”94 Additionally, Lawton blamed the 
Cuban soldiers for stifling local economic recovery, because local planters “hesitate to 
reclaim their farms, fearing loss from pilfering of their crops by these bands.”95 While 
Lawton waited for McKinley and Alger to return to the capital, he sent a return note to 
Belanzo kindly asking how many rations he required.96 On McKinley’s return, Corbin 
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reconfirmed that according to congressional law “no subsistence…will be issued to any 
armed troops other than the United States.”97 With the President confirming Lawton’s 
preferred policy, the general politely informed the Cubans that because the “war is practically 
over and further resort to arms cannot be contemplated,” he endorsed an early disbanding of 
the forces, “that they may return to their plantations and other civil avocations.”98 Not 
wanting to seem unsympathetic or brash, Lawton sent Belanzo the necessary rations, but 
insisted that he did not have the authority to do so again.99 Additionally, Lawton promised to 
help the Cuban soldiers after they disbanded “by the issue of rations to them individually 
until they can secure employment or mature a crop on their plantations.”100 Lawton’s strategy 
worked. He successfully appealed to the War Department for a policy that forced the Cuban 
Liberation Army to disband. Then, in dealing with the Cuban officers in his vicinity, he acted 
as if the McKinley administration’s policy had tied his hands while treating the Cuban 
officers cordially and still giving them a few necessary supplies, seeking their counsel, and 
promising to aid the mambises after they disbanded. 
The U.S. Army soon began employing these tactics across the Department of 
Santiago. On September 9, Circular Number 3, stated that “No subsistence or other stores 
will be issued to any armed troops other than that of the United States, the law providing that 
issues be made only to ‘inhabitants of the Island of Cuba who are in immediate danger of 
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perishing unless they receive the same.’”101 Only after the War Department decided to 
compel the Cuban Army to disband did it start strictly enforcing this law. In his Annual 
Report, Wood reported on the success of this tactic in compelling the destitute soldiers of the 
Cuban Liberation Army to disband in September and October. He exaggerated when he 
bragged that by “the end of October there were no Cuban soldiers under arms anywhere in 
the province.”102 In fact, some western parts of the province still remained outside of 
American control and contained both Spanish and Cuban units, yet within weeks these Cuban 
formations also disbanded. Wood’s patron, Lodge, lauded Wood’s success in “breaking up 
the Cuban Army.”103 Thus, Lawton and Wood established an effective policy of using food 
as a weapon to compel the Cuban formations to disband as the U.S. occupation expanded. 
Ever diplomatic, Lawton incorporated the local Cuban Army commanders into the 
military government, first as paid advisors and later as officials in the military government. 
By late August, Lawton established a close working relationship with Castillo, the Cuban 
Liberation Army commander of the troops in the Santiago Province. Castillo’s soldiers lost 
67 of his men fighting alongside Lawton’s troops against the Spanish. Now, Castillo and 
Lawton each approached their superiors for approval to have Castillo placed in a paid 
position under Lawton’s command. Lawton assured Corbin that Castillo favored the U.S. 
policy of “disbanding the Cuban force.”104 After Lawton’s sudden departure, Castillo became 
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Wood’s closest Cuban advisor, and Castillo eventually became the first civil governor of the 
province during the military government. Lawton’s technique remained the norm even after 
Wood assumed command of the department. By maintaining excellent relations with 
Generals García, Gómez, and Castillo, Lawton assuaged their fears of an uncompromising or 
lasting American occupation. Unlike his predecessor, he assured Corbin that he expected that 
“no serious complications will arise” from the Cubans.105 
Lawton’s conciliatory measures went a long way in limiting the possibility of the 
Cuban Liberation Army waging a new war against the American occupation army, but 
General Gómez played the largest role in ensuring that the Cuban officers and soldiers 
cooperated with the U.S. Army. Historian John Lawrence Tone describes how Gómez used 
his reputation and prestige to suppress any talk among his subordinates of renewing the 
Cuban War of Independence. Gómez believed the U.S. would honor the Teller Amendment 
and understood that the extreme destitution of his army eliminated any other course of 
action.106 To repair relations with the U.S. Army after García’s falling out with Shafter, 
Gómez relieved García of command of the Eastern Department but did not accept his 
resignation, knowing that he held too much influence over the soldiers in Santiago and 
hoping not to make a powerful enemy. Gómez sent Division General Pedro A. Pérez to 
replace García, with instructions to obey orders from U.S. Commander in Chief in Santiago, 
“who are the ones that direct operations in that Dept.”107 Nonetheless, Lawton held less ill 
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will against García than Shafter or even Gómez. On September 6, Lawton invited the old 
Cuban General to visit him in Santiago de Cuba to discuss matters in person, saying, “that 
any small cause for resentment should be forgotten.”108 
Perhaps out of economic desperation or a sense that the Americans were the new 
power brokers in Cuba, García soon visited Lawton, who found him “warmly in accord with 
our policy and is giving me the support of his influence.”109 García’s friends let Lawton 
know in private of the Cuban generals’ destitution. Lawton understood García’s influence 
and recommended to Corbin that the War Department appoint the impoverished General to 
an important commission. Lawton remarked that “his influence is great and we will purchase 
it cheap by giving him a good salary and a position commensurate with his former rank.”110 
The War Department took Lawton’s advice and placed García on the five-man commission 
sent to Washington in December to negotiate compensation for the soldiers of the Cuban 
Liberation Army across all of Cuba, so they would disband. In the negotiations García 
insisted, against the vehement protests of the other commissioners, that only the low sum of 
$3 million was necessary to pay off the Cuban soldiers. This dollar figure was the exact 
amount remaining in the discretionary funds Congress appropriated to the President to fight 
Spain and not nearly what the Spanish commissioners were sent to request. Clearly Lawton 
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and Wood did purchase García for cheap. Unfortunately, the U.S. lost its new ally when 
García contracted pneumonia while in New York, and he died on December 11.111 
During the initial occupation of Cuba, the U.S. Army feared that the Cuban Army 
might wage a guerrilla war against the U.S. occupation or launch vengeful attacks against 
native-born Spanish merchants and planters. After encouraging the War Department to create 
a policy that authorized the U.S. Army to force the Cubans Army to disband and accept U.S. 
supremacy in the Department of Santiago, the U.S. Army began to force the destitute Cuban 
soldiers to disperse in order to receive necessary rations, and the U.S. Army neutralized the 
Cuban Army’s leadership by incorporating their officers into the military government by 
appointing them into official positions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TAKING PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE TOWNS IN THE PROVINCE 
 
The same process of withholding rations and offering employment to compel the 
Cuban Liberation Army in Santiago de Cuba repeated itself across the department. Just as in 
Santiago de Cuba, the local Cuban insurgents and U.S. Army commanders initially struggled 
for dominance, but with more force, food, and the support of the top Cuban generals, the 
garrison commanders soon disbanded the rival Cuban forces and asserted control over these 
small communities. In return, the U.S. Army’s garrison commanders incorporated the local 
Cuban insurgent leaders into official positions in the municipal government. Lawton and 
subsequently Wood gave these garrison commanders the same guidance that they received 
from Washington. They were to end hostilities, protect personal property and rights, and treat 
the Cuban soldiers kindly, but also ensure that all recognized the supremacy of the U.S. 
government in the Department of Santiago. After the Spanish surrender, Lawton first 
established garrisons in towns already under his control. Subsequently, he garrisoned those 
towns immediately under Toral’s command, which the general had ceded to the Americans in 
the surrender negotiations. Other towns in the province not immediately under Toral’s 
jurisdiction, such as Manzanillo, Holguín, and Gibara, remained occupied until the Spanish 
troops departed for Havana or Spain after the commissioners formally ended the war by 
signing the Treaty of Paris. But accessibility also mattered. Until the rainy season ended in 
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late October, the U.S. Army’s forces could only reach those towns by transport ships or rail. 
Only after the few roads and footpaths dried out enough for pack trains to use could garrisons 
move into these interior towns. 
Once the U.S. Army began to relieve the immediate humanitarian crises and started to 
evacuate both the 5th Corps and Spanish prisoners, the U.S. forces started to garrison the 
other major towns in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. One of the first towns occupied was 
the Province of Santiago’s third largest city: Guantánamo. The U.S. Navy landed marines in 
Guantánamo Bay as early as June 10, 1898; however, the actual city of Guantánamo 
remained under Spanish control, and was 14 miles of rail away from the port of 
Caimanera.112 In late July, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long relayed important 
information from Rear Admiral William Sampson to the War Department concerning the 
unsettling condition of affairs in the town of Guantánamo. Not only were a third of the 5,000 
Spanish soldiers there sick, but a Spanish cavalry detachment under General Antonio Pareja 
also dispersed a force of loyalist militia vigilantes who tried to storm the city jail and execute 
the Cuban political prisoners there. Fortunately, the fast-acting Spanish commander promised 
to continue protecting the political prisoners until the arrival of U.S. or Cuban forces enabled 
their safe release.113 
Ewers, in his first duty after being assigned to the Department of Santiago, arrived in 
Guantánamo in early August with his staff to reconnoiter the city for the purpose of 
determining the number of troops necessary to garrison the city. A Civil War veteran, Ewers 
received a regular commission in 1864. He spent the next thirty-two years on the American 
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frontier, earning a brevet promotion for leading a charge in a blinding snowstorm that 
dislodged Crazy Horse’s troops from their position on Wolf Mountain.114 After his arrival in 
Cuba, Ewers noted that the countryside around Guantánamo offered good prospects for a 
quick economic recovery because none of the sixteen major plantations around the city were 
destroyed during the war. He thought a regiment should garrison the city to protect the 
nearby plantations and that the Cuban political prisoners held in prison for “several years 
without trial” by the Spanish should be released as soon as U.S. troops arrived to ensure their 
safety.115 To send his critical report, Ewers relied on two mounted Cuban soldiers whom he 
furnished with food and fodder. He asked that they be resupplied in Santiago for the difficult 
return journey. This suggests that Ewers initially worked well with the Cuban Liberation 
Army outside of Guantánamo.116 
On August 21, a battalion of Colonel Ray’s 3rd U.S.V.I. arrived to garrison 
Guantánamo.117 The troops immediately disarmed the volatile Spanish militia forces, relieved 
Spanish Army, and released the Cuban political prisoners in the city jail.118 As Lawton had 
done in Santiago de Cuba, Ray prohibited anyone except municipal police and U.S. military 
patrols from carrying arms in Guantánamo and the nearby town of Jamaica. He authorized 
these patrols and police to confiscate weapons from anyone who violated this order and to 
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turn the violators over to the civil magistrates.119 Symbolically, this order marked the end of 
hostilities and allowed the U.S. Army to assert undisputed control over Guantánamo by 
monopolizing military force in the city. 
The timing of Ray’s order was no accident. The very day he issued it, two regiments 
of Cuban soldiers consolidated outside the city and threatened to enter it, after allegedly 
hearing a rumor that the Spanish prisoners, awaiting shipment to Spain, planned to rebel.120 
Since almost all of the Spanish prisoners were well behaved and happy to be returning to 
Spain, Ray and Lawton had good reason to question the Cuban Liberation Army’s motives. 
Their suspicions seemed justified when the Cuban Liberation Army’s intention to march into 
Guantánamo with the Cuban Flag became known. Asserting that Guantánamo was territory 
of the United States, Ray responded to the Cuban proposition by stating, “he would look 
upon this action as hostile and call out his men.”121 After the Cubans backed down from their 
legitimate right to control the city that they had fought for three years to run, they asked Ray 
for 4,000 rations to prevent themselves from starving. Ray quickly forwarded their request to 
Department Headquarters and soon after learned that the law stated he could issue rations “to 
all who were destitute,” including Cuban soldiers.122 Of course, the War Department used the 
same wording of the law to deny Cuban soldiers rations a month later. This pragmatic 
approach enabled Ray to offer a carrot as well as a stick to the Cuban battalions in 
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Guantánamo. In light of his orders to maintain control, treat the Cubans kindly, and ensure 
that they respected the supremacy of U.S. authority, Ray handled the situation skillfully. 
Ray’s Immunes not only feared the Cuban soldiers camped outside Guantánamo but 
they also worried about local militias still loyal to Spain. A patrol searching for these loyalist 
militiamen in the dark jungle one night became alarmed at the sound of troops moving to 
their front and fired into the shadows. Private Mack H. Brinkley recalled that the men he was 
with kept “frying [sic] to keep them from advancing on us.” Unknowingly, the soldiers on 
Brinkley’s patrol were firing at their own men who had become separated in the dark uneven 
terrain. Fortunately, the fire from their .45 caliber Springfield rifles was ineffective and they 
realized their mistake “before anyone was killed.”123 Besides these two potentially dangerous 
incidents, the battalion from the 3rd U.S.V.I. had no other problems in maintaining order in 
Guantánamo for the rest of the initial occupation. 
After completing his reconnaissance of Guantánamo, Ewers took command of the 
U.S. garrison in and around San Luis.124 This town of 6,000 lay on a railroad line running 20 
miles South into Santiago de Cuba.125 The 8th Illinois Infantry reached the city eight days 
before Ewers.126 On arrival the commander of the 8th Illinois wrote his governor in 
Springfield that the “the Cuban Soldiers want to take possession of everything. They still 
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carry arms, but do not come into the city armed.”127 Just as in Santiago de Cuba and 
Guantánamo, the local insurgents around San Luis wanted to have a say in administering the 
town they spent years fighting to control. And, just as before, the local U.S. Army 
commander compelled by the War Department’s policy kept the armed mambises out of the 
town to maintain order and establish the supremacy of the U.S. government in the 
Department of Santiago.  As in the other towns, the U.S. Army initially fed the starving 
Cuban soldiers and gave some conservative Cuban officers positions in the new municipal 
government. On August 31, the 23rd Kansas Infantry arrived, easing the burden on Ewers and 
the 8th Illinois.128 Finally, on September 9, the last remaining regiment of African Americans 
not already in San Luis, the 9th U.S.V.I., was assigned to Ewers and formed the third 
regiment of his brigade.129 
Soon after arriving in San Luis, Ewers received reports of about 1,500 Spanish 
loyalist guerrillas in the mountains above San Luis. The general posted notice that they had 
just a few days to surrender before the U.S. Army would come up and clear them out. As a 
precaution the 8th Illinois posted an extra line of pickets around their camp and issued 
ammunition. Moreover, Colonel Marshall had his men sleep under arms. The rumor of 
Spanish militia in the mountains proved later to be false, but to the sentries on duty each 
night the threat of an attack was very real. One night, an unsuspecting farmer drove his ox 
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cart through the picket line and a jittery sentry shot the poor ox in the darkness. Hearing the 
first shot, other sentries discharged their weapons, raising the general alarm. Soon an entire 
battalion of soldiers was formed in the darkness awaiting the expected Spanish attack. 
Company H observed movement to its front and unleashed a volley of fire into the darkness. 
Regrettably, for Private Smith and Blakes, two sentries on duty to the company’s front, the 
soldiers of H company shot both of their comrades with well aimed shots from over a quarter 
of a mile away in the darkness. Private Smith received a fatal shot through the neck and his 
lifeless body lay undiscovered until morning, while Private Blakes received a wound through 
the thigh. Major Charles G. Starr, sent to investigate the tragedy, blamed the mishap on a 
“nervous and green sentry” and Company H, which was “equally frightened but was stopped 
by the officers as soon as they could reach the Company.”130 This event caused a stir in the 
press about the unsuitability of African American officers, but Lawton shrugged off these 
opinions, commenting that the black officers controlled their men admirably once they 
arrived to their formations and that their troops showed exceptional marksmanship in the 
dark. This unfortunate account of friendly fire illustrates how seriously the U.S. Army 
soldiers perceived the threat of Spanish militia attacks in the first month of the initial 
occupation.131 
Ewers’s brigade of African-American soldiers not only garrisoned the town of San 
Luis, but also occupied the smaller towns and villages in the vicinity. The largest, Palma 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Starr to Adjutant General, Santiago, August 21, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1487, 
Box 1, 62. 
131 Miles V. Lynk, The Black Troopers, Or Daring Heroism of the Negro Soldiers in the Spanish-American War 
(Urbana, NY: AMS, 1971, reprint of 1899 ed.) 137-138. Corporal W. T. Goode, The “Eighth Illinois” (Blakely 
Printing Company: Chicago, 1899), 133-138. Starr to Adjutant General, Santiago, August 21, 1898, National 
Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1487, Box 1, 62. William B. Gatewood Jr., “Smoked Yankees” and the 
Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902 (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1971), 184, 
192. 
	   54	  
Soriano, boasted a population of 4,000.132 E and F Companies of the 8th Illinois garrisoned 
the town. One of the few African American officers to hold an independent command of a 
garrison during the initial occupation, Major Robert R. Jackson commanded the detachment. 
His garrison got along well with the Cubans in this community. Many of his soldiers even 
married local women. The small patrols and details also felt little threat from the local 
mambises. Corporal Goode in Company F went on a patrol with a squad of soldiers but soon 
became separated in the thick jungle. After hours of wandering hopelessly through tall grass 
and streams, he encountered a small formation of Cuban soldiers on their way to Santiago to 
turn in their weapons and disband. Goods’s fear of these Cubans soldiers quickly turned into 
admiration as the helpful mambises told the hapless corporal that there were “mucho 
American soldou [sic] over there,” reuniting the corporal with his squad. If the Cuban 
Liberation Army had resisted the American occupation, it would have become impossible for 
small patrols, like Goode’s, to retrieve water and wood or to send supplies to small outlying 
posts without the backing of larger units to provide security. The soldiers in Palma Soriano 
cooperated so well with the local Cubans that they were more offended than anything else 
when they heard that Cuban guerrillas might attack the garrison over a small charge of 
mistreatment by a soldier against a local. Despite the fact that these African-American 
soldiers favored the Cubans in their area more than the wealthier Spanish-born elites, they 
strictly followed their orders to protect all individuals and property and to end the state of 
hostilities. For example, when the Cubans turned over a man who spied for the Spanish 
during the war, Major Jackson quickly released him. And Company K, commanded by 
Captain Leon W. Denison, a black law student in Chicago, guarded the largest sugar mill in 
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the area, owned by a hated foreign-born Spanish sympathizer named Creausau. Company K 
prevented attempts to burn the plantation and mill. Soon after the 8th Illinois left Cuba, the 
mill was left unguarded, and the Cubans quickly put it to the torch.133 
Later, Wood assigned the 2nd U.S.V.I. to Ewers brigade in order to garrison the towns 
of Songo, El Cristo, and El Cobre.134 With populations of only a few thousand each, these 
towns lay scattered in the rugged countryside north of Santiago de Cuba. Wood ordered 
garrisons sent there after receiving a report for Second Lieutenant Rooney on his return from 
delivering supplies to the destitute in El Cobre by mule train. Rooney encountered many 
armed Cuban soldiers and officers in the town celebrating a “feast day” who noted “in 
conversation with them, upon the situation I find an order has been issued for them to disarm 
and get to work; this has not yet reached them all through its regular channel.”135 Still 
treating armed Cubans as a challenge to U.S. authority in the department, Wood sent the 2nd 
Immunes to garrison these towns as soon as the trails became dry enough to supply them. 
After only a month in these towns, the 2nd Immunes established the supremacy of the 
military government. Wood then abruptly ordered Ewers to replace these 2nd U.S.V.I. 
garrisons with other companies from his three regiments of African American soldiers. Wood 
specified that the relief of the 2nd Immunes should be done so that “these points will not be 
left without a garrison” for even a moment. Wood planned for the 2nd U.S.V.I. to move by 
transport ship to occupy towns on the north coast of Cuba, soon to be abandoned by the 
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Spanish Army. Wood sought to have U.S. troops in the towns before the Spanish soldiers 
departed to prevent disorders from occurring and Cubans from dictating local policy 
decisions to the U.S. military government.136 
The Spanish first surrendered the towns of Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo on the 
north coast of Santiago. The soldiers there belonged to Toral’s command, and he surrendered 
these garrisons at the same time he surrendered Santiago de Cuba under the same condition 
that they be shipped to Spain. On August 29, Lawton ordered a battalion from the 3rd U.S.V.I 
under Major T. Wylly to take the transport San Juan to Baracoa and Sagua de Tánamo. 
Wylly arrived in Baracoa on September 5 with two companies and Captain Marion W. Harris 
steamed off with the remaining two companies, arriving to garrison Sagua de Tánamo the 
next day.137 Later, the 3rd Immunes kept only a single company in Sagua de Tánamo under 
Captain Harris who reported to Baracoa.138 On arriving to Baracoa, Major Wylly found 500 
Spanish soldiers in fortifications facing 600 mambises awaiting their departure. Just as the 
U.S. Army did elsewhere, Wylly prohibited the Cubans from entering Baracoa until all the 
Spanish prisoners departed for Guantánamo to meet transports from Spain. Once they left, 
the Cuban soldiers could enter without arms. Wylly maintained the peace and affirmed that 
the U.S. Army set policy, not the Cubans. As an inducement for cooperation, Wylly came 
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equipped with 10,000 rations to feed needy Cubans and mambises who disarmed and 
submitted to U.S. authority.139 
Wylly (recently promoted to lieutenant colonel) tolerated no opposition to U.S. 
authority. When the Cuban brigadier general in command of the area refused to allow 
workers to cross his lines to work on the plantations outside of the town, probably owned by 
Spanish loyalists, Wylly arrested him the first time he entered the city and disarmed his 35-
man bodyguard.140 A former major in the Cuban Army assaulted the foreman of a public 
works project, and Wylly confined the attacker for 30 days with only bread and water. Cuban 
officers approached Wylly and demanded their former comrade’s release. Although the 
Cuban Army in the area outnumbered his men by at least four to one, the brash Wylly did not 
yield. He firmly stated that their comrade would remain confined and that “any attempt to 
rescue him … would be met with force of arms” and that if any of Cuban soldiers were found 
in the city with arms “they would be arrested and severely punished.”141 No one challenged 
Wylly’s authority in Baracoa again, and soon thereafter Cuban Colonel Francisco Valiente, a 
conservative and pro-American officer, arrived from Santiago to help Wylly pick other 
conservative Cubans to run the civil administration and municipal police.142 
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Despite the fact that the Cuban and U.S. Armies did not fight each other during the 
initial occupation of Cuba, at times tensions between them almost boiled over. The U.S. 
exploited the exhausted and badly undersupplied Cuban Army into accepting its authority 
and co-opted conservative leaders from the Cuban Army. It was a skillful approach. In his 
letter to Corbin on September 13, Lawton best summarized his policy for garrisoning the 
major towns in the Department of Santiago and the necessity of continuing this strategy. 
“Troops will be required at these places so long as armed Cubans occupy the country or the 
United States retains control of the Island against the sentiment of a majority of the Cubans, 
or while it is necessary to distribute large quantities of sustenance,” Lawton wrote.143 The 
U.S. Army physically controlled the province by establishing Army garrisons in the 
population centers, using the incentives of sustenance and jobs to disband the Cuban 
Liberation Army, and employing unfair racial prejudices to delegitimize the Cuban ability to 
effectively self-govern. These U.S. actions enabled the U.S. to undertake a subsequent three-
year occupation, implement reforms, and form of a long-term U.S. policy that stripped Cuba  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PROBLEM OF RACE: AMERICAN VIEWS OF CUBAN SOLDIERS 
 
 Historians writing about the occupation of Cuba or late 19th-century U.S. imperialism 
often use race as a primary methodological construct to explain the U.S. Army’s actions and 
behaviors toward the people in the former Spanish colonies. Obviously, a majority of white 
Americans in the late 19th century held fervent ethnocentric views and extended those views 
to the Cubans and their soldiers. Understanding how an individual’s racial prejudices 
affected their decision-making can be an important analytical tool for explaining their 
specific decisions. Historians who have applied this lens in previous research, however, have 
tended to underestimate or under-represent the diversity of perspectives on race and ethnicity 
that existed among the officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army. At one extreme on the 
spectrum of racial prejudice were white officers from the Southern states.  At the other end 
were the black officers and soldiers who composed more than a third of the U.S. Army’s 
forces in Cuba during the initial occupation. Even within these opposing social groups, 
individuals’ views on ethnicity often varied greatly. Given this significant difference in racial 
attitudes, it is not surprising that the U.S. officers’ and enlisted men’s views of Cuban 
soldiers were wide-ranging and defy a simple characterization. Therefore, to truly understand 
the racial element of the U.S. occupation of Cuba, it would be necessary to consider each 
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individual’s background and motives to explain their behaviors and to avoid pigeonholing the 
entire U.S. Army as having one uniform attitude toward the Cubans and their soldiers. 
 The first historians to write on the U.S. occupation of Cuba, David F. Healy and 
Philip S. Foner, portrayed the U.S. Army and American war correspondents as being 
prejudiced against the Cuban soldiers for two major reasons. First, they argued that the 
Americans discriminated against the Cuban soldiers in Santiago because most of them were 
black and, secondly, they sought to undermine the significant role they played in the fighting 
to undercut their claim to self-determination after the cessation of hostilities. Healy correctly 
argues that the “American army had been developing an anti-Cuban bias of astonishing 
intensity,” and that “it soon became a commonplace in the army at Santiago that the Cubans 
would neither fight nor work and had served no useful function in the campaign.”144 
Similarly, Foner complained, “with so many southerners as officers and privates in the 
American army, the fact that the Cuban army was composed largely of Negroes was enough 
to earn this contempt, regardless of the contribution it made to the campaign.”145 Both 
historians correctly agree that these racial prejudices unfairly undermined the significant role 
that the Cubans played as both auxiliaries and fighters in Santiago. The majority of firsthand 
accounts confirm this interpretation of the deep racial contempt that the U.S. soldiers and 
correspondents quickly developed toward the Cubans. 
More recent studies of the War with Spain and the subsequent occupation of Cuba 
further reinforce that Americans’ racial prejudices and their unjust perception that the Cubans 
offered little assistance to the fighting at Santiago quickly tainted the U.S. Army’s view of 
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the Cuban soldiers. Despite the differences in their interpretations of the conduct of the war 
and subsequent occupation, David F. Trask, John Lawrence Tone, Graham A. Cosmas, and 
Louis A. Pérez all agree on the reasons why the American attitudes toward the Cuban 
soldiers rapidly soured. They separately note that before the United States joined the conflict, 
the American press almost always incorrectly portrayed the Cuban mambises as members of 
a white conventional army, so that the U.S. soldiers were shocked when they landed in 
Santiago to meet the largely black Cuban guerrilla forces clothed in rags and unable to fight 
with the same conventional tactics used by the U.S. Army. Furthermore, the desperate state 
of the Cuban mambises forced them to beg for food and clothing and steal unguarded 
American supplies. Shafter’s use of the Cuban soldiers during the siege primarily in auxiliary 
role––scouts, laborers, and guides––both angered the proud Cubans and created a perception 
among the U.S. soldiers and American correspondents that the mambises were nothing more 
than ungrateful scroungers watching the fighting on the sidelines. This American perception 
was reinforced by the fact that the typical U.S. soldier and officer had no knowledge of the 
significant fighting the Cubans did to help the U.S. Marines hold a defensive position on a 
hill overlooking Guantánamo Bay from a large Spanish attack; the successful effort by 
García’s forces to clear the Spanish from the U.S. Army’s landing sites at Siboney; the 
shared fighting the Cubans did with Lawton at El Caney; or the numerous skirmishes the 
Cubans fought to prevent the Spanish garrisons in the province from reinforcing the besieged 
Spanish garrison. Instead, Shafter and the news correspondents focused almost entirely on 
the inability of García’s Cuban soldiers to stop a relief column of 3,500 Spanish soldiers 
under Colonel Frederico Escario from Manzanillo from entering Santiago during the siege, 
despite the determined efforts of the much smaller Cuban force to block it. All these 
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historians accurately reflected how American racial prejudices devalued the meaningful role 
the Cubans played in the fighting and created an unfair estimation among the majority of 
Americans in and out of Cuba that the Cubans did not significantly contribute to the joint 
victory over the Spanish in Santiago.146 
The only weakness in this largely accurate interpretation of the relations between the 
Cuban and American soldiers during the siege and beginning of the initial occupation is that, 
with a few exceptions, it generally ignores the considerable minority of U.S. Army officers 
and soldiers who did not share the prevalent unfavorable view of the Cuban soldiers.147 
Miles, Lawton, and Ludlow were among the U.S. generals who openly lauded the important 
contribution the Cuban army made toward the victory in over the Spanish in Santiago. In 
Miles’s memoir, Serving the Republic, he reflected on the important role the Cubans played 
throughout the Santiago campaign and acknowledged the spirited attempts the outnumbered 
Cuban forces made to halt the advance of the Spanish relief column from Manzanillo.148 He 
concluded, “it will thus be seen that the Cuban troops took an active and most important part 
in that campaign, and are entitled to credit accordingly.”149 The Commanding General of the 
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Army’s complimentary remarks thirteen years after the war echoed the sentiments he 
expressed in 1899 in his article summarizing the War with Spain for the North American 
Review years. Here he stated that the “Cubans are entitled to at least a good share of the 
credit” and “their part in obtaining the results should not be thus lightly be dismissed.”150 
Of the three American generals who wrote glowingly about the Cuban participation 
immediately following the Spanish surrender, none match the sincerity and eloquence of 
Ludlow’s letter to García dated July 15. In the letter, Ludlow congratulated their “combined 
forces” for their success in Santiago, and he extolled the Cubans for their invaluable and 
“notable service” as both auxiliaries and as fighters who shared a flank with his troops as 
equals in the investment of Santiago.151 Ludlow thanked García for the Cuban officer’s 
“innumerable personal courtesies” and signed the letter off with the valediction, “I beg to 
remain your obedient servant.”152 Lawton’s praise for the Cuban soldiers under Castillo who 
fought with him at El Caney were less heartfelt than Ludlow’s, but he reported to Corbin that 
the Cubans “did fairly good service” under him losing “67 killed and wounded.”153 Clearly, 
these generals did not show the same racial contempt toward the Cuban soldiers as the 
majority of American officers, soldiers, and correspondents. Why not? Miles’s memoirs and 
correspondence show that, despite his eccentricities, he was an extremely progressive 
proponent of racial equality, whereas Ludlow consistently showed deference towards the 
Cuban officers and upper class Cubans generally. Lastly, Lawton was always diplomatic 
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towards his enemies and allies. Although Ludlow, Lawton and Miles all viewed the Cubans 
with respect and deference for their contributions their views were not prevalent among the 
other U.S. generals in Santiago. However, they certainly comprised a significant and high-
ranking minority and thus challenge the idea that the highest military authorities all viewed 
the Cubans with contempt. 
Had Shafter dealt as amicably with García and the other Cuban officers as Ludlow 
and Lawton did, much of the tension between the U.S. Army and the Cuban Liberation Army 
would have been avoided. Shafter held strong racial prejudices against the Cubans, but his 
decision to exclude them from the peace negotiations, capitulation ceremony, and occupation 
government had as much to do with his egotistical personality and orders from the War 
Department as his racial prejudices. Shafter received specific guidance from McKinley to 
avoid any recognition of the Cubans as formal belligerents or to give them an official role in 
the occupation government, but his decision to deny them even symbolic representation in 
the surrender negotiations and ceremony had more to do with Shafter’s personality. Selfishly 
denying that either the Cubans or the U.S. Navy played a significant role in the Spanish 
capitulation, Shafter also denied Rear Admiral William T. Sampson’s repeated request to 
have a representative from the U.S. Navy present during the peace negotiations or to sign the 
articles of capitulation or attend the surrender ceremony.154 Clearly, Shafter’s refusal to 
include the Navy and Cubans in the surrender ceremonies had as much to do with his egotism 
as his strong racial prejudices. 
Several field grade officers also showed respect for the achievements of the Cuban 
Army and avoided labeling the Cubans with typical racial stereotypes. In April, Miles 
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dispatched Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan to Cuba to locate García and obtain information on 
the Cuban forces in Santiago and establish good relations.155 For his intrepid work, Rowan 
received command of the 6th Immunes and a volunteer commission as a colonel. The close 
relationships he formed with the Cuban officers during his time in Cuba led Miles later to ask 
him to conduct an interview with García in September 1898 and write an official report to 
shed a positive light on the Cuban Liberation Army’s role in the fighting in Santiago. Miles 
and Rowan both sincerely sought to reveal the Cubans’ important role in the fighting. 
Although Rowan feverishly took on this assignment out of deference for his Cuban officer 
friends, perhaps Miles did it more to undermine Shafter’s condescending view of the Cuban 
army, because the two were bitter rivals and represented different factions within the U.S. 
Army’s officer corps.156 
Another field grade officer who spoke favorably of Cuban soldiers was the 
Department of Santiago’s Inspector General, Major James H. McLeary. During his 
inspection tour in December 1898, he noted that Cuban “soldiers having been disbanded are 
raising corn and potatoes, and considered Americans as their best friends. They are all 
contented and happy.” While McLeary grossly overstates the happiness of the disbanded 
mambises with the Americans and their economic condition, his view of the former Cuban 
soldiers is a far cry from the derogatory remarks made by U.S. soldiers during and in the 
immediate aftermath of the fighting around Santiago de Cuba. This example shows that as 
the U.S. Army won the struggle for control over the Cuban Liberation Army and the tension 
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between the two armies dissipated, the U.S. Army’s more overtly racist remarks dismissing 
the Cuban soldiers gave way to more paternalistic ones––perhaps equally racist in origin, but 
very different in tone and result. 
The officers and enlisted soldiers in the three black regiments garrisoning Santiago 
thought much better of the Cuban soldiers than the majority of white soldiers in the regiment 
of regulars and the four volunteer regiments recruited from the Deep South. Corporal W. T. 
Goode of the 8th Illinois remembered no major conflicts with the mambises in Palma Soriano, 
and he recalls them as being helpful and “friendly” as they marched to Santiago de Cuba to 
turn in their weapons before returning to a civilian life.157 Captain William H. Coston, the 
black Chaplain of the 9th U.S.V.I., received his appointment directly from President 
McKinley. At 16, Coston worked as a janitor at Hopkins Grammar School in New Haven. 
With hard work and devoted study he earned admission to Yale Divinity School and upon 
graduation became the minister at the prestigious A. M. E. Church.158 Coston deeply 
criticized the derogatory news reports that the American press published characterizing the 
Cuban soldiers as “cave-dwellers, or something quite forsaken” whose officers soldiers and 
officers were only “there for personal gain” and not to fight.159 Challenging these reports, 
Coston logically argued that if the Cuban soldiers “are the cowards that our newspaper men 
represent them, their accomplishments, while at war with their enemies, prove an unsolvable 
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mystery.”160 He attributed this unfavorable view of the Cuban soldiers’ courage by the 
American press and U.S. Army soldiers “to the different methods of fighting employed by 
the two armies.”161 Despite the fact that that many, if not most, of the white soldiers who 
fought and occupied the Province of Santiago held racial prejudices against the Cuban 
soldiers, the majority of black American officers and soldiers viewed the predominately 
black Cuban soldiers in a better light. 
The members of the U.S. Army often deliberately employed strongly held racial 
prejudices against the Cubans in Santiago to achieve specific ends, but when no tension 
existed between the two armies, these prejudices tended to drift into a dormant state.  Even 
those who did not hold strong racial prejudices had their own underlying motives for praising 
the conduct of the Cubans. These complexities underline the difficulties of using racial 
prejudice as a methodological construct to explain the actions and motivations of the U.S. 
Army in Cuba. Again, it is important to emphasize that a majority of U.S. officers and 
soldiers did hold racial prejudices against the Cuban soldiers, but a significant minority did 
not for a multitude of reasons. Furthermore, after the U.S. Army established control over the 
province by disbanding the Cuban Liberation Army and the Cuban soldiers no longer posed a 
challenge to the U.S. Army, overt racial prejudices usually became replaced by a more subtle 
paternalistic racism. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINANCING THE OCCUPATION 
 
A monopoly of military force enables a state to impose its authority on its own 
subjects and on an occupied people. For a military force to be effective, however, it must be 
continually sustained. During the Cuban War of Independence, the Cuban Army never 
suffered from a lack of recruits and even defeated the Spanish Army in battle on a few 
occasions, but its lack of weapons, food, and supplies prevented the Cuban Army from 
winning the war independently. Later, the U.S. Army’s commanders in Santiago capitalized 
on the Cuban Liberation Army’s deficiencies to compel it to disband. Similar to waging war, 
an occupation is costly. Feeding and equipping an army overseas costs more than sustaining 
it at home, particularly due to the cost of ocean transport and building port facilities, medical 
facilities, communication systems, and new barracks. The additional expense associated with 
administering a government in the occupied country compounded the costs of these 
infrastructure improvements. 
Deeply concerned about how to pay for the war with Spain, McKinley and the War 
Department considered how to pay for the pending occupation even before the Spanish 
surrendered Santiago de Cuba. The solution they devised was simple: the Spanish 
government primarily used the tariff revenues collected on imported items and the export of 
raw material to pay for the cost of administering its Cuban colony, so the McKinley 
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administration would simply adopt and enforce the existing Spanish tariff laws to fund the 
occupation. McKinley still needed to go back to a sympathetic, but fiscally conservative, 
Republican majority in Congress to request additional funding for the expanded army of 
volunteers and the costs associated with delivering food and military equipment overseas. 
Congress even paid for the millions of rations given to needy Cubans. Yet almost all of the 
other funds used to make infrastructure improvements in Santiago and pay for the costs of 
administering the military government came from tariff duties collected on goods entering 
and raw material leaving Cuban ports.  
The U.S. Army gradually expanded its control over the coastal towns in the 
Department of Santiago as ships became available to transport Spanish troops home and 
bring U.S. garrisons to take their place. But the War Department did not wait for the 
transition before collecting tariff revenues. It immediately sent representatives to take control 
of the customs houses and the funds in the surrendered territory. The satellite customs houses 
sent the tariff revenues collected to the department headquarters in Santiago de Cuba. After 
analyzing all the proposed monthly expenditures across the province, the department 
commander redistributed the collected revenues back to the local garrison commanders to 
cover the costs of local reconstruction projects and running the local municipal governments. 
The McKinley administration created a private banking entity run by U.S. investors for the 
military occupation to hold the collected tariff funds. Finally, to end the financial and 
administrative chaos of having numerous national currencies in use in Santiago Province, the 
McKinley administration and the War Department created policies that manipulated the 
currency so that the U.S. dollar became the sole currency in use. 
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The day after the Spanish surrendered Santiago de Cuba, Shafter immediately opened 
the port to merchant ships to unload their urgently needed cargoes in the city, and he ordered 
the local customs collector to use the existing tariff schedules to collect dues. Not wanting to 
overstep his authority, Shafter immediately cabled the War Department for further guidance. 
The reply did not take long. The President and his advisors had just finalized a plan that they 
had been working on for days to deal with this expected problem of financing the occupation. 
McKinley and his advisors instructed the Secretary of War to have Shafter immediately 
arrange “to collect customs duties and port charges on goods and ships entering Santiago or 
other ports or places coming under our control.”162 Furthermore, McKinley instructed the 
War Department to use the existing Spanish tariff schedules for goods imported from the 
Spanish mainland for all goods entering the country including imports from the United 
States, but he repealed the additional $1 per ton tax on cargoes and replaced it with a more 
reasonable 20 cents per ton rate.163 McKinley’s new policy abolished the mercantile system 
of trade with Cuba, which had given Spanish goods favored rates for the previous 400 years. 
By requiring all nations, including the United States, to pay the same tariff rates, the 
McKinley administration upheld the free market principles its campaign promised. The fact 
that the administration already had a clear plan for collecting revenue at the time of Toral’s 
surrender also demonstrates that they had been pondering how to pay for the occupation for 
quite some time. This is supported by the fact that only three days after the surrender, the 
President authorized the newly created North American Trust Company of New York City to 
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operate out of Santiago de Cuba as the official financial agent of the U.S. government.164 The 
creation of a banking entity and the election of board members was surely not the work of a 
mere three days. 
Soon after the McKinley administration established its customs policy and sanctioned 
the North American Trust Company to act as a bank for the military government in Santiago, 
it ordered the Treasury Department to send a customs official to administer the customs 
house in Santiago de Cuba. The administration appointed Walter A. Donaldson to the 
position. He had more than 20 years of experience as a customs collector in various ports in 
the United States and a familiarity with the Spanish language and tariff system.165 
Donaldson’s experience allowed him to quickly erect an efficient customs service in the 
Department of Santiago. Although many several Spanish customs officers resigned and 
returned to Spain after the Spanish surrender, this did not hamper the efficiency of 
Donaldson’s office. Following McKinley’s explicit guidance, Donaldson allowed existing 
Spanish customs officials to retain their positions if they so desired unless they were known 
to be exceptionally corrupt. The collector of customs in Baracoa, John López Chávez, 
typified the uncertainty the former Spanish officials felt about retaining their old positions 
with the U.S. Army taking control of the province. López wrote Donaldson to ask if he 
should continue his former duties under the American occupation, to which Donaldson 
immediately affirmed that he should carry on in his former position and specified the number 
of clerks, boatmen, and inspectors López was authorized to employ.166 Donaldson found the 
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Spanish customs bureaucracy bloated with extraneous personnel, and he sought few 
replacements for the positions vacated by Spanish officials returning to the Peninsula. The 
few vacancies that required replacements Donaldson easily filled with the many qualified 
applicants from both the United States and Cuba. 
Unlike Donaldson, who found the customs house bloated with extraneous personnel, 
Lawton found his own military staff insufficient to account properly for the increasing 
volume of funds turned over by Donaldson’s collectors and expended by his military 
government. In the first five weeks of the occupation, Lawton’s headquarters processed the 
collection and expenditure of $90,000.167 Lawton requested a professional bookkeeper to 
account for every penny, knowing that auditors from Inspector’s General’s Department 
inevitably would arrive to scrutinize all of his receipts and books. On August 29, Lawton 
wrote the head accountant of the Inspector General’s Department, W. T. Kent, asking for the 
name of a “good accountant and book-keeper capable of superintending the receipt, 
disbursement and accounting of the revenues from duties, taxes and other sources.”168 Kent 
recommended Lieutenant Colonel Cook of the 1st Rhode Island Infantry, and Lawton 
immediately requested to Corbin that he assign the Lieutenant Colonel to his department.169  
Fortunately for Lawton, the War Department sent him the necessary staff to account 
for the department’s finances, since the volume of funds that it processed grew substantially 
with increased imports and exports as the U.S. Army garrisons brought peace and order to 
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the province. By November 1, the customs house in Santiago de Cuba alone collected 
$221,636.65, not to mention the equally large dues that other ports in the department 
gathered.170 Despite a reported plague that eliminated any commerce arriving at the ports of 
Baracoa and Gibara toward the end of the initial occupation, the total revenue that Donaldson 
collected across the province far exceeded Wood’s expectations.171 
Despite the efficiency of his administration of the customs house, Donaldson still 
battled to eliminate a traditional culture of corruption among merchants and local customs 
officials. For centuries, Spain paid its colonial officials such low salaries as to essentially 
sanction corruption. Moreover, the debt crises in Spain forced its government to levy onerous 
tariffs on goods not only to pay for the Cuban colony, but also to send badly needed revenue 
to the treasury in Madrid. Absurdly high tariffs and the culture of corruption made the 
smuggling of goods common practice. Unfortunately, smuggling remained difficult to 
prevent.172 Donaldson employed revenue cutters to patrol the coasts in an attempt to stop 
smugglers from landing merchandise outside of the designated ports of entry. On November 
29, he asked Wood to allow his customs officials to search passengers’ personal baggage.173 
Donaldson’s strong suspicion that passengers were smuggling merchandise in their baggage 
to avoid paying customs proved to be correct. On December 14, his customs agents detained 
Magin Meléndez for smuggling merchandise in his sea trunks and turned him over to military 
officials while he awaited charges in a civil court. According to regulations, Donaldson sold 
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the confiscated merchandise and added the proceeds from the sale to the government’s 
customs account.174 
Just as Wood changed the regulations to allow officials to search personal baggage, 
the War Department made other modifications to the inherited Spanish tariff schedules. The 
President lifted the import duties in September on supplies of food “intended for the relief of 
starving inhabitants of the Island of Cuba,” thereby alleviating relief agencies from paying 
duties on their donations.175 On November 29, Wood ordered administrative reforms to 
ensure proper accountability of employee salaries and duties.176 A week later, Wood 
introduced additional reforms to the procedures that customs officials used to verify ship 
manifests in an effort to prevent smuggling by misrepresenting the actual goods on board a 
merchant ships and to standardize port procedures across the department.177 
Meanwhile, the War Department moved a little too quickly in its attempt to regulate 
and standardize the currency in the Department of Santiago. The military and civilian 
officials in the department struggled to exchange and deposit the myriad of different 
currencies in circulation throughout the province and used to pay duties by foreign merchants 
in the customs house. The War Department responded to this situation by enacting a 
regulation on August 1 that declared the currency of the United States “obligatory for all 
transaction[s] which may take place in this territory.”178 The President of the Santiago de 
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Cuba Chamber of Commerce, Elisio Ros, asked Wood to use his influence to delay the 
enactment of the law. Ros argued that the law was premature, as there was not enough 
American currency yet in circulation, and that it was “prejudicial to the interests of 
commerce and to public wealth on account of depreciation which it would cause in the 
present circulation medium of Spanish coinage, and would besides, cripple mercantile 
operations.”179 It appears that the War Department either repealed the law or limited its 
enforcement as Wood complained in December that the checks he received as payment from 
Spanish merchants in their currency were not being accepted by the Treasury Department.180 
Wood asked the Secretary of the Treasury to have his department accept his checks in 
Spanish currency at the current exchange rate.181 To prevent the Department of Santiago 
from using the Spanish silver coinage that the Republican Party and administration so 
despised, Wood set the exchange rate at 50 cents to the American dollar.182 This encouraged 
the holders of Spanish silver to spend it outside the occupied province, where they could get 
twice the goods or gold for their money. By the end of the initial occupation, almost all 
transactions in Santiago Province occurred in American currency, and while Spanish and 
French gold were still in circulation, Spanish silver disappeared from use.183 
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After Lawton, and later Wood, established control over revenue sources and currency, 
they turned their attention to regulating expenditures. Besides the small accounts budgeted to 
district commanders for pre-approved reconstruction and sanitation projects and local 
municipal tax revenues kept to pay local officials, the Department Commander approved all 
other expenditures in Santiago paid from tariff revenues. Lawton and later Wood tried to act 
in a fiscally responsible manner by reducing the excessive number of government officials 
inherited from the Spanish government. The Spanish administration had appointed an 
unnecessarily large number of employees as an effective form of political patronage, but the 
resulting system was inefficient and lent itself to rampant corruption. Wood and Lawton also 
sought to reduce the use of expensive locally owned properties rented for military purposes. 
To make these cost saving reforms, Lawton issued an order in August requiring all current 
employees, rentals, future hires, and expenditures to be approved by his office. After 
Lawton’s staff reviewed all of the proposed monthly budget, he cut unnecessary expenditures 
by releasing excessive government officials, limiting additional hires, and ordering U.S. 
troops to rent fewer private properties. Furthermore, Lawton strictly prohibited any military 
official from spending more than Lawton allocated them without his approval.184 
These cost saving measures made by the War Department, Donaldson, Lawton, and 
Wood prevented the Department of Santiago from expending more than it collected from 
revenues and going into debt. Additionally, the stability and security provided by U.S. 
garrisons instilled in planters and merchants the confidence to increase the volume of trade in 
the province, consequently increasing the duties and taxes collected. Soon, the Department of 
Santiago was fiscally viable. Wood cheerfully reported to President McKinley at the end of 
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November that “the finance of the province will render it self-sustaining, and it will not be 
necessary for the United States to spend any money in the Province of Santiago, other than 
maintenance of its Army.”185 In November, Wood divided the Department of Santiago into 
four military districts and gave each district commander a few thousand dollars a month to 
supplement locally collected municipal taxes. When combined, these funds allowed the 
district commanders to pay municipal officials’ salaries, do sanitary work, and keep local 
schools and courts open.186 The bulk of the customs funds collected in the province paid for 
larger construction projects, building repairs, and salaries and operating costs for provincial-
level administrative services, including the rural police, the high courts, and state schools of 
higher education. These tariff revenues also funded the civilian doctors’ salaries, hospital 
repairs, and free medicines for needy Cubans.187 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Without controlling these tariff revenues the U.S. government would have lacked the 
means to fund the administration of the Department of Santiago. From the first day of the 
occupation, the McKinley administration adopted the former Spanish tariff schedules to pay 
for the cost of governing Santiago and established a bank to deposit the revenue collected in 
the province. The security provided by the U.S. Army garrisons in the province gave 
merchants and planters the confidence to resume normal economic activity in the U.S.-
occupied parts of the island. The increasing revenues collected from customs dues allowed 
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the War Department to pay for the cost of administering the military government and making 
necessary improvements to the province’s infrastructure to support U.S. Army garrisons. 
These funds also allowed Lawton and Wood to assert more control over the province. The 
processes of establishing military and economic control of the province were mutually 
reinforcing––both needed to occur simultaneously for the U.S. Army to exist in Santiago 
Province. This cycle of increasing security and economic activity allowed for the War 
Department to avoid a costly occupation, in both lives and money.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 8 
BUILDING MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ESTABLISHING LINES OF 
COMMUNICATION 
 
By maintaining monopolies on force and over the collection and distribution of tariff 
revenues, the U.S. Army established total control over the province of Santiago. In January 
1899, Brooke used the same methods developed by Lawton and Wood to assert his authority 
over the Department of Cuba. Similar to Wood, Brooke consolidated all of the revenues 
collected across the island in Havana and managed the expenditures of all of his subordinate 
department commanders. Although first Lawton, then Wood, and finally Brooke spent most 
of the revenues to pay the salaries of government officials, they also repaired and built new 
buildings and roads. Later in the occupation, Wood devoted some construction dollars to 
projects intended solely to help ordinary Cubans, but this did not occur during the initial 
occupation. The first priority for the American generals in Santiago province, and later across 
Cuba, was to build the necessary infrastructure to sustain the U.S. Army garrisons, which 
were maintaining control of the province and enforcing the policies of the McKinley 
administration and the military government. After paying the monthly salaries of the civilian 
employees working for his military government, Wood and his garrison commanders spent 
what remained of their monthly revenue on public works projects that directly facilitated the 
health of his soldiers and the supplying of his men. The construction of roads, port facilities, 
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and the telegraph lines to the U.S. Army’s garrison’s enabled these outposts to control the 
province.188  
Perhaps the most difficult task Lawton and Wood faced during the initial occupation 
was the reconstruction of the destroyed road network in the Province of Santiago to supply 
and communicate with garrisons located in remote towns in the interior. Wood recorded in 
his annual report that “the roads throughout the province are wretched. In fact, it might 
almost be said that we have, with very few exceptions no roads.”189 For the majority of the 
initial occupation, the Quartermaster’s pack trains were the only reliable means of supplying 
the interior garrisons. When the roads permitted it, the quartermaster preferred to use more 
efficient wagons to haul supplies, but pack trains were often the only means of traversing the 
countryside. The Spanish had maintained a road network in Santiago before the Wars of 
Independence but after almost 30 years of neglect and fighting these roads, especially in the 
mountainous and rainy jungles of eastern portion of the province, had fallen into complete 
disrepair.190 During the war the Spanish and Cuban Armies also destroyed bridges, further 
inhibiting the use of roads by U.S. Army wagon trains. The western portion of the Province 
of Santiago had a much better road system, but because these adobe clay roads contained no 
gravel, their surfaces turned into a thick, sticky mud in the rainy season, and were thus 
impassible to wagons until the roads dried in early November. At first, the Quartermaster 
Department suffered from a severe shortage of mules to run the necessary pack trains, but 
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slowly they collected the many stray mules lost by the 5th Corps during the chaotic fighting 
for Santiago de Cuba. The Chief Quartermaster soon gathered a surplus of mules, and with 
permission from the War Department he sold the extra mules to Cubans eager to buy 
livestock.191 
In December 1898, Inspector General Major James H. McLeary noted little 
improvement in the overall condition of the department’s road network on his inspection 
tour. He found that wagons could only travel on the road between Santiago de Cuba and San 
Luis and the road between Holguín and Gibara. Army wagons could not traverse any of the 
other roads in the department for more than “five or ten miles consecutively.”192  His report 
continued to describe how “most of the highways are merely openings through the timber, 
and in wet weather seem to have been abandoned altogether by the pack trains, which have 
pursued narrow paths on the margin of the roads, or taken new routes generally parallel to the 
highway through adjacent timber.”193 As the pack trains crossed the muddy roads to stay on 
the drier high ground, the original roads became overgrown and the meandering footpaths 
that crossed back and forth across the highway increased the total length of any route “from 
twenty to fifty percent.”194 The pathetic state of the roads frustrated Wood, and he spent a 
great deal of money to improve the lines of communication to his isolated garrisons. 
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Not until the summer of 1899 did the road network in the Department of Santiago 
begin to show major improvements. In early December 1898, Wood sent the recently arrived 
Colonel J. S. Pettit, commander of the Military District of Manzanillo, a large number of 
picks, shovels, and other lightweight tools to begin improving the roads in his district. 
Meanwhile, Wood hired two work crews of 100 Cubans each to begin building roads from 
Santiago to Guantánamo and from Santiago de Cuba to Holguín. Wood wanted to build a 
fork off the latter road to Holguín to connect to Bayamo and Manzanillo.195 In San Luis, the 
8th Illinois Infantry cut a 25-mile road from Palma Soriano directly to Santiago de Cuba to 
cut the distance supply trains traveled to Palma Soraino by more than half. The old route 
from Santiago de Cuba to Palma Soriano was 58 miles, because the road went through San 
Luis.196 Before the rainy season began in the late spring, 1899, Wood’s military government 
completed over 200 miles of road suitable for military wagons. Given the difficult terrain and 
climate, as well as the poor state of the existing road network when work began, Wood 
believed that every effort has “been made to repair these roads as rapidly and systematically 
as possible.”197 One unintended consequence of these long-term road construction projects 
was the peaceful dissolution of many Cuban army units; road construction required a large 
labor force, and this gave Wood an opportunity to hire a large number of the unemployed 
former soldiers of the Cuban Liberation Army. These long-term jobs provided added 
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incentive for soldiers to disband and alleviated Wood’s fear of having a large body of armed 
soldiers with no means to support themselves or their families.198 
The same reasons that caused the highways to fall into a state of disrepair also led to 
the neglect of the streets inside the cities and towns of Santiago Province. Most of the streets 
lacked proper drainage, and the daily deluge of water running down the streets during the 
rainy season caused large ruts and cracks to form and littered old cobblestones across the 
road surface.199 By the time U.S. soldiers arrived, the streets looked more like riverbeds than 
roads. The military government spent locally collected municipal taxes and tariff revenue to 
improve the drainage and resurface municipal streets across the department. Santiago de 
Cuba, the capital of the province, received the greatest allocation of the province’s tariff 
revenues, and one of Wood’s top reconstruction priorities was paving the roads in this 
important city. Major C. L. Woodbury supervised the paving contract that called for more 
than five miles of asphalt streets and another five miles of macadam streets in the Santiago de 
Cuba city center. The subtle angles on these new streets whisked water into grated drainage 
ditches, and they had curbs made of concrete and blue stone.200 Although the city did not 
have a modern sewer system, Wood insisted that sewer lines be placed under the newly 
paved streets so they would not have to be destroyed later if a sewer system was added.  
These slow and costly road improvements would not have been necessary to establish 
garrisons in the interior if an extensive railroad network existed in the Department of 
Santiago. Unlike the extensive railroad network spokes originating from Havana in western 
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Cuba, the Province of Santiago only had a few privately owned railroads running from ports 
to large plantations and mines. These antiquated tracks were all built before 1878, as 
recession and government debt prevented the building of new lines.201 The Sabanilla and 
Maroto line linked Santiago de Cuba to San Luis and Songo. Another line leaving Santiago 
de Cuba passed through Siboney on its way to the Juragua Iron Mines. A privately owned 
line linked the Brooks plantations around Jamaica and Guantánamo to the port at Caimanera. 
The large agricultural town of Holguín was connected to the coast by well-maintained tracks 
to Gibara. Unfortunately, the line running from Manzanillo to the equally important farming 
valley of Bayamo deteriorated and was not repaired during the initial occupation.202 The 
exorbitant rates charges by these private rail lines prevented all but the most affluent Cubans 
from using them.203 Even the Quartermaster Department preferred to use inexpensive pack 
trains to resupply the interior towns connected by rail, unless time or the size of the supplies 
necessitated the use of the expensive railroads. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Army garrisoned 
the few interior towns that railroads linked to the coast before communities that had to be 
supplied by pack train. 
Although roads proved costly and slow for the military government to repair, they 
were still within Wood’s limited budget. The high cost of material and equipment for railroad 
construction forced Wood to attempt to grant concessions to private companies and bankers 
to build new railroads. On November 15, Wood sent Corbin an application from the Messars, 
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Brauet & Co., the former bankers of the Spanish Army in Santiago, to build a railroad 
covering a large portion of Santiago province. Wood had Lieutenant Blount of the 3rd 
U.S.V.I., a lawyer versed in Spanish law, review the application to ensure it met the existing 
laws for granting a charter. The only exception the impatient general wanted to make to the 
Spanish concession laws was one to speed up the slow process.204 Unfortunately for Wood, 
the War Department resisted granting the concession until the shrewd businessman, and now 
Secretary of War, Alger could implement a system that enabled him to grant concessions in a 
manner that benefitted both his acquaintances and the friends of the administration. After the 
American press ran an article on the board Alger established to review these concessions in 
Cuba, public outrage enabled Senator Joseph B. Foraker to introduce an amendment that 
specified, “no property franchises, or concessions of any kind whatever, shall be granted by 
the United States, or by any other military or other authority whatever in the Island of Cuba 
during the Occupation thereof by the United States.”205 Senators John C. Spooner and Orville 
H. Platt, both annexationists, opposed the amendment. However, when the ardent imperialist 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge lent his support to the measure, the Foraker Amendment carried 
through the Senate by a 36 vote margin.206 This Congressional amendment prevented further 
exploitation of Cuba by Alger, but also hampered most railroad construction during the 
occupation of Cuba. 
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While Wood worked to improve the road and rail network, he and the previous 
commanders relied heavily on sea transport to move supplies, soldiers, and messages to the 
dispersed garrisons in the department. The port in the city of Santiago de Cuba was the most 
important point in the department’s logistical infrastructure. Most of the military stores, 
humanitarian relief, and private merchandise landed there first before being distributed by 
small coastal vessels to the other ports in the province. From the very first day of the 
occupation, improving the port’s logistical and navigational infrastructure became a top 
priority for the U.S. Army’s senior commanders and logisticians.  
After the Spanish surrendered and the U.S. Navy removed the mines at the mouth of 
the Bay of Santiago de Cuba, U.S. supply transports and merchant ships immediately began 
unloading their supplies directly on the docks in the harbor. This was particularly important 
because during the fighting a huge backlog of transports developed, mostly because of a 
severe shortage of shallow drafted lighters to unload the transport ships that could access the 
shallow landing site at Siboney. The docks at Santiago de Cuba only had enough space to 
accommodate a few of the dozens of ships waiting to unload their military stores, 
humanitarian supplies, and merchandise at any one time. Even after the Cuban pilots and 
stevedores and the U.S. Army Quartermaster officers in charge of the port operations 
relieved the backlog of ships, Lawton and Wood recognized that improved port facilities 
were still needed to make the harbor suitable to support the U.S. Army’s garrisons in the 
department.    
The lack of coal to refuel the transports before returning to the United States forced 
the Quartermaster officers to either buy coal from the Navy or send ships to other Caribbean 
ports before returning to the United States. These delays proved costly and inefficient. 
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Shafter wrote to the Corbin on August 9 pleading, “we must have coal here.”207 Shafter 
continued, “a loaded collier, with all the necessary appliances for unloading, should be sent 
here as soon as possible.”208 After the War Department remedied the coal problem, focus 
turned to increasing the size and capacity of Dock #1, used by the Quartermaster Department 
to unload government contracted transports. By the end of the initial occupation, Wood 
approved the expenditure of funds collected from Cuban tariffs to extend and Dock #1 150 
feet, and a roof to the extension, and repair the existing portion of the dock.209 In late 
November, Wood learned that lawyers representing Callego, Messo & Co., the once-absentee 
owners of many of the wharves and warehouses in Santiago de Cuba, filed claims in 
Washington, D.C. asking for $300 per day back payment for the U.S. Army’s use of their 
facilities. Wood believed this price was “preposterous” and “nothing less than an attempt of 
extortion.”210 He suggested that the War Department pay no more than $50 per day for the 
use of the facilities.211 In addition, Wood asked permission to use a small portion of the 
revenue collected from customs duties to build storage sheds to protect commissary, noting 
that the cost for building the sheds would quickly pay for itself with the money saved by not 
using privately owned warehouses and from the daily loss of food from the weather and 
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thieves.212 Besides the sheds, Wood eventually funded the construction of a new warehouse 
and a seawall to protect the harbor.213 
Wood oversaw other improvements to the harbors in the Department of Santiago to 
ensure safe navigation. During the siege of Santiago de Cuba, a shell from a U.S. Navy ship 
hit the lighthouse located in El Morro Castle, an obsolete Spanish fortress guarding the 
mouth of the bay, making the lighthouse “practically useless and liable to tumble down at 
any moment.”214 During an inspection tour of a Spanish government shed Wood uncovered 
the parts needed to repair the lighthouse in Santiago.215 Before the outbreak of hostilities, the 
Spanish had intended to use the parts to build a new lighthouse in Guantánamo. Wood 
assigned the engineer Lieutenant E. C. Brooks to use the parts to first repair the lighthouse at 
Morro Castle and then construct a new lighthouse at Guantánamo Bay.216 With the parts 
already on hand, Wood estimated that repairs to the lighthouse at El Morro Castle would only 
cost his military government $500 for the cost of employing Cuban laborers.217 Later, after a 
merchant ship sank on the north coast of Santiago Province, Wood asked Corbin to send a 
tender with repair parts from the United States to fix the neglected lighthouses on that side of 
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the province, with the understanding that the associated costs would be charged to the 
Department of Santiago.218 While Wood and his engineers strove to repair lighthouses, the 
U.S. Navy placed navigational buoys in all the major harbors in the Department of 
Santiago.219 Also in Santiago de Cuba, Wood and Donaldson created a board of pilotage to 
standardize the fees charged by navigational pilots in the ports across the department.220 
These improvements to the port facilities enabled the merchant ships and, more importantly, 
the U.S. government transports to efficiently unload and safely move their cargos to the 
garrisons controlling the Department of Santiago. 
Although ships were preferable to using riders or pack trains to send military 
correspondence to all but the nearest outposts, telegraph lines remained the quickest and 
easiest way for the department commander to communicate with his subordinate officers and 
to his superiors in the War Department. Lawton and Wood considered telegraph 
communications essential to their ability to command and control their dispersed outposts 
effectively, and they went to great lengths to establish, maintain, and secure these 
communication lines. Immediately after the establishment of the Department of Santiago, all 
the staff bureaus in the War Department began planning the equipment and personnel 
required to sustain the U.S. Army’s forces in the occupied province. Brigadier General 
Adolphus W. Greely, Chief of the Signal Corps of the Army since 1887, wrote Lawton 
asking him what transportation assets and “how many miles of line material” he should send 
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with the signal company preparing to leave for Santiago.221 Greely, a veteran of the Civil 
War, Indian Wars, and a three-year polar expedition, promised to fully support Lawton in 
establishing effective communications in Santiago. Greely had good reason to care. He was 
one of the few members of his command to survive a three-year tour at an arctic 
meteorological station because they lacked communications to coordinate a rescue after 
frozen seas prevented their supply or rescue.  
Despite Greely’s desire to send any materials needed, Lawton simply did not know 
the condition of the lines in the province at the start of the initial occupation. After consulting 
the signal officer in Santiago, Lawton only knew that the lines running from Santiago de 
Cuba to Cristo, Songo, San Luis, and Palma Soriano required “fifteen miles No. 9 wire, 1500 
each brackets, and insulators with spikes.”222  Lawton and his signal officer only understood 
what repairs were needed to fix the lines in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, and could only 
speculate as to the condition of the once extensive telegraph network that existed across the 
province before the outbreak of the Cuban War of Independence.223 Fortunately, they rightly 
assumed that the other lines in the province were also destroyed in the fighting and that none 
of the tools or telegraph materials needed existed in the province. Therefore, Lawton 
requested that the signal company bring 50 additional miles worth of line material to start 
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with, all the necessary construction tools, and its own “wagons, harness, and animals [that] 
will render it independent and free to move without delays.”224 
Just as President McKinley and the War Department immediately considered using 
tariff revenues to pay for the occupation and military government, Greely also needed a way 
to pay for the cost of maintaining the telegraph lines in Santiago. On September 1, Greely 
ordered the chief signal officer in Santiago to use the funds collected for the transmission of 
messages to pay for the maintenance of the lines and to send any surplus revenue to the 
treasury.225 Unlike the railroads, the telegraph lines in Cuba were state owned and not private 
property, allowing the military government to charge for their use, make repairs, or add 
extensions to existing lines whenever required. Unfortunately for Greely and the department 
commander, however, the revenues collected for transmitting messages did not cover the cost 
of maintaining the lines, and tariff revenues had to be used to supplement the maintenance 
costs. The difficult terrain and the inexperience of the Cuban linemen and station operators 
made the telegraph service in the department unreliable where it existed during the initial 
occupation. To get a message from Santiago de Cuba to Havana took an appallingly slow 24 
hours. The inexperienced crews and difficult terrain also slowed maintenance and building 
efforts, thereby increasing the number of days for which laborers needed to be hired. 
Additionally, using the “prompt and reliable” French and British owned cables to 
communicate with the United States incurred major costs to the War Department and military 
government in Santiago.226 
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The men who volunteered for the U.S. Army’s Signal Corps for the war with Spain 
were predominately professional signalmen. On arriving in Santiago, they found that Cuban 
soldiers had almost completely destroyed the old Spanish lines during the war and that the 
work required to build new ones would be arduous and dangerous. The experienced 
signalmen and their Cuban workmen traversed narrow footpaths, placed new poles, and 
strung telegraph wire through some of the most difficult terrain in Cuba. Even after 
completing the lines, these work crews constantly had to venture back onto these perilous 
tracks to repair broken wires, mainly caused by falling trees. Workmen and many mules were 
injured or killed in accidents while working in this dangerous terrain, and many more 
signalmen became infected with tropical diseases. For example, Lieutenant Frank W. Dunn 
died when a tree fell on him while he supervised the construction of the Baracoa line, and 
two other signal officers died of yellow fever.227 
In addition to disease, hazardous trails, and falling trees, the signal crews repaired 
damage done by Cuban saboteurs and those who simply stole essential materials from the 
telegraph lines. In November, the English Cable Company reported that the houses sheltering 
their junction boxes at El Morro Castle and Punta Blanca were broken into and the “cables 
interfered with.”228 Not only did this damage cost the owners lost revenue, but it also cut one 
of Wood’s essential lines of communication with the War Department. Wood ordered 
permanent guards posted at the two junction boxes. Similarly, after someone repeatedly 
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tampered with the telegraph line between the towns of Songo and Macuriges, Wood ordered 
the commander of the 9th Immune garrison in Sango to send patrols to “prevent in whatever 
way is necessary and all interference with the line” and to find someone within his ranks to 
make the necessary repairs.229 Throughout the occupation, running, maintaining, and 
protecting the telegraph lines to the garrisons made great demands on the soldiers and 
signalmen in Santiago. 
Despite the difficult terrain, dangers, and high costs, the U.S. Army’s signalmen and 
their Cuban work crews eventually ran a communication network that connected all the 
major garrisons and towns to the rest of Cuba. The volunteer signal company arrived in 
Santiago in the first week of September and immediately went to work running lines to the 
few U.S. Army garrisons already established in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. After signal 
crews repaired the existing line running to Ewers’s garrison at San Luis, First Lieutenant 
William Jarvie and Second Lieutenant Franics Creighton and a small work crew began to 
construct the first new line to the isolated garrison at Palma Soriano.230 
Once telegraph wires connected the garrisons located near Santiago de Cuba, the 
Signal Company began constructing a series of lines that linked all the towns in the southern 
portion of the province, from Baracoa to Manzanillo. As work crews built lines east toward 
Guantánamo and Baracoa, Lieutenant C. H. Martin’s crew laid line to the west from Palma 
Soriano toward Manzanillo. The Chief Signal Officer in Santiago, Captain Frederick T. 
Leigh, provided Martin with the signal supplies, tools, and hired a crew of Cuban workers, 
and he asked the Adjutant General in Santiago to issue orders to the Quartermaster 
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Department to provide the pack train, fodder, and teamsters. Additionally, the Chief 
Commissary Officer gave a written order to Martin that allowed him to draw rations from 
any commissary officer in the department. The five signal soldiers, seventeen Cuban 
workers, and all of their equipment and animals also received railroad passes to San Luis 
where they would start their expedition. Finally, the Chief Signal Officer made a special 
request that the quartermaster civilian teamster, J. C. Shaffer be put in charge of the pack 
train. Shaffer and the Chief Signal Officer served together when Shaffer was still in the 
Army, and reliable teamsters were hard to come by.231 By mid December, Martin had used 
most of his wire and insulators. Instead of returning all the way to San Luis to pick up the 
supplies, the new Chief Signal Officer, Captain Frederick T. Leigh, requested that a second 
quartermaster pack train drop the supplies to him at Jiguani or Bayamo, saving him at least 
seven days of time in travel, during which time Martin’s crew could be working.232 
Soon after Martin’s expedition reached Bayamo, the last major town before the 
telegraph terminus at Manzanillo, the expedition ran out of poles and money to pay the 
unskilled Cuban laborers. Once again, telegraph construction had gone over budget. Given 
the importance of communicating with his outposts, Wood ordered Pettit, in charge of the 
garrison in Manzanillo, to use his own funds to purchase additional poles and hire laborers, 
so that Martin could finish the final leg of the telegraph wire. Wood promised that the funds 
Pettit used would be reimbursed and would not count against his normal appropriations.233 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Chief Signal Officer to Adjutant General, Dept. Santiago, November 8, 1898, National Archives, Record 
Group 395, Entry 1487, Box 4, 2801. 
232 Leigh to Adjutant General, Dept. Santiago, December 14, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, 
Entry 1487, Box 4, 3982 
233 Beacom to Pettit, December 30, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1479, Vol. 3 of 8, 
November 17, 1898 to January 6, 1899, 414. 
	   95	  
After connecting all the garrisons on the south coast with telegraph wires, the signal 
crews began connecting the north coast towns of Mayarí and Gibara to the “Main Line,” 
which linked Santiago Province to the Province of Puerto Principe. These lines proved to be 
the most difficult for the signal company to construct. Second Lieutenant William T. 
Davenport spent most of December looking for a route to cross the interior of the western 
portion of Santiago Province. Reports first indicated that the best route across the interior ran 
from Jiguani to Holguín, but after searching in vain for an acceptable path, Davenport 
learned from a Cuban that no Spanish telegraph wire had ever traversed this difficult route. 
From Holguín, Davenport saw that the old Spanish telegraph wire used to run to Bayamo and 
that 390 poles still remained standing on this old route. He speculated that very few of these 
old poles were still serviceable, but they did help to mark the path the new line should take. 
Davenport rated the Bayamo route to Holguín as the easiest route of the three proposed to 
cross the interior. He also found the old Spanish line used to connect Holguín to Las Tunas 
and the rest of Cuba. Davenport’s effective scouting in the last month of the initial 
occupation identified the last paths needed to complete the telegraph network in the 
Department of Santiago and link it to the telegraphs in the rest of Cuba.234  
Unlike the telegraph lines that belonged to the Spanish Government, the few 
telephone systems in the province of Santiago belonged to private companies who had been 
granted concessions and monopolies by the Spanish government. Wood had no power to 
repeal these concessions. Instead, he had his lawyers look at the terms of the original 
concessions in the hopes that the companies violated the original terms and investigated the 
possibility of buying out the concessions so that municipalities could run their own telephone 
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service. None of Wood’s ideas to establish private telephone exchanges in any of the towns, 
however, came to fruition during the initial occupation.235 The Signal Corps did install a 
telephone exchange in the city of Santiago de Cuba specifically for military and government 
use, which did not violate the Spanish government’s concession. The telephone system gave 
Wood and his staff officers in Santiago de Cuba “a rapid means of [communicating] between 
the many offices and depots of the various military and civil departments.”236 This system 
consisted of 30 phones and 25 miles of telephone wire.237 
By the start of the rainy season in May 1899, the U.S. Army’s signal soldiers and 
Cuban assistants had military telephone exchanges in three other occupied towns and ran a 
total of 663 miles of new telegraph wires in the Department of Santiago.238 Although the 
military government in the Department of Santiago spent a great deal of money and energy 
building and then maintaining the telegraph network during the initial occupation, by the 
time the formal occupation began in 1899, the signalmen and Cuban work crews succeeded 
in establishing reliable communications to the several garrisons controlling the province and 
the newly established Division Headquarters in Havana. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SANITATION: CONTROLLING DISEASE 
 
Just as moving supplies and communicating with the garrisons was necessary for the 
U.S. Army in Santiago to establish control over the Cuban Army and civilian population, so 
was keeping the American soldiers healthy and in fighting condition. Both Lawton and Wood 
fought with the 5th Corps and witnessed how tropical fevers and dysentery turned the U.S. 
Army’s soldiers from an effective fighting force to an army of invalids. Acting in accordance 
with the best science of the time, the officers and doctors believed that all these diseases were 
caused by unsanitary conditions, and they took extreme measures to disinfect their 
environment. Although two Cuban physicians, Carlos Finlay and his associate Claudio 
Delgado, already suspected that the Aëdes aegypti mosquito was the vector for yellow fever, 
it was not until 1900 that an Army medical team under Walter Reed proved Finlay’s 
hypothesis.239 The U.S. Army’s sterilization methods did help to diminish the number of 
cases of dysentery and other preventable ailments, even if they did not directly reduce the 
incidence of yellow fever. Additionally, many of the sanitation measures, such as clearing 
standing water and vegetation around camps, indirectly reduced disease caused by 
mosquitos. The U.S. Army officers and soldiers wanted to improve the health of the Cubans 
for humanitarian reasons, but also because an unhealthy environment and infirm Cuban 
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civilians directly imperiled the health of the American soldiers occupying the country. 
Concern for Cuban civilians was of secondary importance to the garrison commanders, but it 
mattered nonetheless. 
The humanitarian crises in Santiago de Cuba compelled Shafter to place the young 
Wood in command of the city following the Spanish surrender. Wood proved an able 
commander during the fighting around the city, but more importantly he was still officially 
an Army surgeon. Besides providing medical care to infirm soldiers, Army physicians during 
this time were responsible for inspecting and enforcing sanitary measures in camps. This 
made Wood a logical choice to run a city plagued by disease after three years of conflict, a 
bombardment, and siege.240 On arrival into the city to receive the Spanish surrender, the 
officers of the 5th Corps found the streets covered in garbage, excrement, and dead and dying 
animals. So many Cubans died each day from hunger and diseases that they had to be burned 
in large funeral pyres of almost a hundred bodies at a time.241 Wood, with total authority 
within Santiago de Cuba, went to work with his usual energy, efficiency, and ruthlessness, 
using draconian measures to sterilize and disinfect the city. Wood created a sanitary 
department whose medical officers inspected every house and building and forced the entire 
population to assist in cleaning the city.242 Wood consulted with Major Barber, who 
apparently had experience with street cleaning in New York City and Chicago, about writing 
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sanitary regulations for Santiago de Cuba.243 Anyone caught violating his strict sanitary 
regulations was arrested and brought before a military tribunal where the general summarily 
punished the accused either with lashes or by forcing him to join sanitation work parties.244 
By the end of August, Wood’s ruthless battle against disease paid off. Despite only a slight 
drop in the number of fever cases, the population and the soldiers garrisoning the clean city 
had much better health overall. Wood estimated the death rate in Santiago de Cuba fell 50% 
below its pre-war levels.245 Although Wood and other doctors mistakenly believed that 
cleanliness alone could stop malaria and yellow fever, some of their sanitary methods 
indirectly reduced the rate of mosquito-borne illness. Wood supervised the dredging of the 
sewer flats and swamps outside the city of Santiago de Cuba. By the end of the initial 
occupation, engineers diverted the city’s sewage away from the swamps and into the deep 
ocean water by El Morro Castle. Also, the U.S. Army’s engineers completed construction 
plans to build a modern “intercepting sewer” with “disinfecting and settling basins.”246 
The cost of disinfecting the city soon added up. When Lawton asked the Army’s 
Quartermaster General, Brigadier General Marshall I. Ludington, to send large quantities of 
chloride lime, disinfectant, street brooms, and kerosene to burn infected materials, Ludington 
promised to send as much as Lawton requested. Ludington, however, insisted that Lawton 
use customs revenue to reimburse the Quartermaster Department for the sanitation supplies 
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shipped to Santiago.247 Initially, some of the sanitation materials sent by the staff bureaus 
were paid for by the War Department, but by October the large increase in the tariff revenues 
collected in Santiago led the Secretary of War to order that all additional sanitation materials 
sent would be charged to the Department of Santiago.248  
In all the towns in the province, U.S. Army garrison commanders implemented the 
same sanitation methods that Wood first employed in Santiago to sterilize the streets and 
buildings. These garrison commanders used the funds they had collected from small 
municipal taxes and money the department commander dedicated for these measures.249 The 
exception to this rule was Holguín, where “over eight thousand cubic yards of unsanitary 
material [had] been removed, and every effort [was] being made to thoroughly disinfect all 
buildings which [had] been occupied by small pox patients.”250 The high cost of purchasing 
vaccinations and sterilizing the entire town to eradicate a smallpox epidemic went beyond 
what municipal officials could raise on their own, forcing Wood to supplement the revenues 
he had sent to the commander garrisoning Holguín.251 
Wood also used tariff revenues to make other improvements, which were vitally 
important to sustaining both the U.S. Army’s soldiers and the civilian population of the city. 
During the siege of Santiago de Cuba, the U.S. Army cut off the water supply to city. After 
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the surrender, U.S. Army engineers restored the flow of water to the city, but soon realized 
that the flow into the city was insufficient to meet demand. Lieutenant E. C. Brooks repaired 
leaks in the aqueduct and began work to heightening the dam at the reservoir in order to 
increase the city’s water supply. He also replaced the old pipes with a larger four-inch 
pipeline, doubling the flow of water into the city. Unfortunately, Wood estimated that the 
increased water supply still provided only a “fifth of what is needed” in the city.252 Wood and 
his engineers had a progressive plan to provide the city with an adequate water supply, but 
Wood did not have sufficient funds to begin the necessary construction by the end of the 
initial occupation.253 
The U.S. Army’s physicians in Cuba also desperately wanted ice to relieve the 
suffering of the many infirm soldiers in Santiago.  Fortunately, Nathan Straus, the co-owner 
of both the R. H. Macy Company and Abraham & Straus department stores in New York 
City, donated an expensive ice plant to the U.S. Army specifically for the benefit of the “sick 
and wounded soldiers” in Santiago.254 Alger ordered that the Quartermaster Department ship 
the donated ice plant as quickly as possible and at no charge to the already generous donor.255 
Despite the Quartermaster Department’s best effort, it took over a month to transport the 
plant to Santiago de Cuba.256 By the time construction finished, the 5th Corps had already 
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departed for New York, but the ice plant still helped the garrison in Santiago de Cuba and the 
sick Cubans and Americans in the hospitals. 
The strict standards of cleanliness that the garrison commanders and Army doctors 
imposed on the Cuban towns originated from the Army’s own regulations on camp life. 
Since, before the Civil War the U.S. Army understood that clean and sanitized camps 
reduced disease rates among its soldiers. Despite the best efforts of the Army’s officers and 
doctors in Santiago to ruthlessly enforce every health regulation and observe best practices, 
the soldiers still suffered from high rates of fever until the end of the rainy season. This did 
not stop these doctors and officers from trying new methods to battle the fevers. When the 
garrison regiments first arrived, the officers and commanders exerted a great deal of effort 
selecting campsites on high ground close to water supplies. After pitching the units’ tents, the 
officers ensured that the soldiers immediately dug drainage ditches, kept the camps well 
policed, and that food, animal, and human waste were disposed of in regularly sanitized sinks 
far from the sleeping tents. The Inspector General Department and senior medical officers 
regularly inspected the regimental camps and garrisons to ensure that Officers strictly 
enforced all sanitary and health regulations.   
Wood sent Doctor R. S. Woodson, a Captain and an assistant surgeon in the Army’s 
Medical Department, on several inspection tours of the garrisons and camps in the 
Department of Santiago. In November, Woodson examined the camp of the six companies 
garrisoning Guantánamo from the 3rd U.S.V.I. There the doctor found the “camp well 
selected, on a sloping hill-side, well ditched and drained.”257 Additionally, Woodson reported 
that the “privy and kitchen sinks were carefully dug and well policed,” and that the water the 
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soldiers drank from the Guantánamo River was pumped into an iron reservoir tank and then 
“piped into a large cauldron and boiled” before the soldiers drank it.258 Despite the sanitary 
conditions of the camp, the “immune” companies still had almost a quarter of their soldiers 
sick with malarial fevers.259 To the frustration of the doctors, officers, and soldiers of the 
U.S. Army living in the camps, even the best sanitation measures did little to slow the high 
rate of tropical fevers. 
Another problem with the camps was the cost of renting privately owned land and 
paying for the damages done to it by the soldiers living there. In October, Luis Dagnese, the 
owner of the La Chivera estate where the 5th Infantry was camped outside Santiago de Cuba, 
complained to Lawton about the damage done to his property by the soldiers. Not only had 
the soldiers cut down 30 coconut trees and removed the posts from his wire fences for fuel, 
but the military traffic coming to and from his camp created a road in his pasturelands. When 
Dagnese complained to the commanding officer of the camp, Dagnese reported that he “was 
insulted by the interpreter.”260 Upon receiving the note, Lawton asked the commander of the 
5th Infantry for an investigation and a report on the incident.261  
Towards the end of the initial occupation, the War Department and Wood realized 
that living in tented camps, no matter how clean and orderly, exposed the soldiers somehow 
to malaria and yellow fever. Complaints from the property owners such as Mr. Dagnese 
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probably also influenced the War Department, in consultation with Wood, to place all the 
soldiers in government-owned barracks before the arrival of the next rainy season. Wood 
ordered the Quartermaster Department in Santiago to supervise the sanitizing of existing 
barracks and the construction of any new barracks required for the garrisons.262 Given that 
Wood and the Army’s surgeons blamed the high disease rates among Spanish soldiers in 
Cuba during the war on the unsanitary conditions of their barracks, the Quartermaster 
Department and local commanders focused on completely sterilizing and overhauling the 
Spanish barracks before they allowed their soldiers to live in them.263 Where barracks did not 
exist, the Quartermaster department built new ones, repurposed other government buildings, 
or rented private buildings. All of these options incurred significant cost to the Quartermaster 
Department, and drained Wood’s limited tariff revenues.  
Even rented private buildings required sanitation. In Palma Soriano, the two 
companies from the 8th Illinois Infantry garrisoning the town first lived in old palm sheds 
previously used as shelter for pack animals. Corporal W. T. Goode complained that the fleas 
in these sheds feasted on the soldiers––each morning the soldiers shook their hammocks and 
blankets and dispatched the fat fleas that fell to the ground, too full of the soldiers’ blood to 
hop away.264 When one 8th Illinois soldier bitterly complained about the flea problem, his 
comrade sarcastically reminded him that he had volunteered in Springfield to “come and 
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fight these fleas. Now let them eat.”265 Eventually, the sanitation measures taken by the 
soldiers of the 8th Illinois took care of their flea problem. 
In Santiago de Cuba, the 5th Infantry’s two battalions moved from the La Chivera 
estate into the Mercedes Barracks, previously used by the Spanish Army and transformed 
during the fighting into a makeshift hospital. Chief Surgeon Havard, concerned about the 
disease-ridden barracks, insured that the Quartermaster Department thoroughly repaired and 
disinfected the barracks before allowing the battalions to occupy the barracks in 
November.266 The Mercedes Barracks did not have room for the regimental hospital or 
officers’ quarters. The hospital remained outside under canvas,267 and Lawton received 
permission from the Secretary of War to rent quarters for the officers of the 5th Infantry.268 In 
Baracoa, before Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Wylly moved his garrison from a well 
sanitized camp to the old Spanish hospital and fort located on a hill west of the town, he 
oversaw the extensive remodeling and sanitation measures in the hospital. Scientific theory 
of the day assumed that microbes in the soil caused most diseases. Therefore, Wylly ordered 
the floors and the top two feet of soil removed in the barracks. The workers replaced the soil 
with “fresh gravel and covered over with a one half inch layer of concrete.”269 Wylly even 
had water pumped up the hill from the Baracoa water works to a reservoir, and distributed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Corporal W. T. Goode, The “Eighth Illinois” (Blakely Printing Company: Chicago, 1899), 180. 
266 National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1504, Annual Report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U.S. 
Volunteers, Commanding Department of Santiago, 1899, 49. 
267 National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1504, Annual Report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U.S. 
Volunteers, Commanding Department of Santiago, 1899, 49. 
268 Ludington to Lawton, October 6, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1479, Vol. 2 of 8, 
October 4, 1898 to November 21, 1898, 54. 
269 Woodson to Adjutant General, Department of Santiago, November 4, 1898, National Archives, Record 
Group 395, Entry 1487, Box 3, 2782. 
	   106	  
pipe throughout the newly named Fort Wood.270 While these clean and remodeled barracks 
did not reduce the number of fever cases, they did improve the comfort and general health of 
the garrisons across the Department of Santiago. 
By the end of the initial occupation the War Department in conjunction with the 
officers in the Department of Santiago developed a system to sustain the garrisons in the 
province. Always cognizant of costs, McKinley and his advisors implemented the same 
system of tariff schedules to pay for the military occupation that the Spanish had relied on to 
finance their Cuban colony. As security improved in the department, commerce also 
increased until tariff and tax revenues sufficiently paid for the military government. Shafter, 
Lawton, and Wood, all reduced the overhead costs of their administrations by releasing 
superfluous government employees, reducing the number of rented buildings used by the 
Army, and controlling the spending of their subordinate commanders. Besides paying for the 
administration of the province, each of the subsequent department commanders used the 
tariff revenue to make infrastructure improvements necessary to supply and maintain the 
isolated garrisons. The officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army and the Cubans worked 
diligently to repair the harbor facilities as well as the road and telegraph networks in the 
province, so that before the rainy season arrived in May 1899, they had established effective 
lines of communication throughout the Department of Santiago. Maintaining the health of the 
garrisons was just as important as supplying them. The garrison commanders and the U.S. 
Army physicians enforced ruthless sanitation measures in the towns and military camps in 
their spirited, but sometimes misdirected, attempts to curve the epidemics of diseases and 
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tropical fevers. By the end of the initial occupation, the medical measures implemented by 
the U.S. Army and the placement of soldiers in cleanly barracks greatly reduced the sick 
rates among the Army’s soldiers until the arrival of the next rainy season. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION: THE FRONTIER LEGACY IN SANTIAGO 
 
The U.S. Army in Santiago’s system of garrisons spread through twenty-one towns 
and villages in the Department of Santiago by the end of the initial occupation, effectively 
controlled both the Cuban and Spanish-born populations. In January 1899, the garrisons in 
Santiago de Cuba and San Luis each consisted of more than a regiment of soldiers. 
Additionally, four large towns had garrisons with at least a battalion’s (four companies) 
worth of soldiers, and an additional five towns had garrisons with at least two companies. 
Finally, ten villages had a single company garrisoning them. This distribution enabled the 
U.S. Army to maximize its power and control the population. Widely dispersed as they were, 
their security and persistence, however, were only made possible through first compelling the 
Cuban Liberation Army and Spanish loyalist militias to disband and then by establishing a 
logistical system capable of sustaining them.271 
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To compel the Cuban soldiers to disband and pursue peaceful employment, the U.S. 
Army capitalized on the Cuban Liberation Army’s persistent inability to supply, feed, or pay 
its troops. Once the U.S. Army established a monopoly of military force in the province, it 
was free to administer the province as it saw fit. Brooke later implemented the same method 
of establishing control over the population by placing garrisons in major population centers 
to pacify the rest of Cuba. With U.S. Army garrisons in every town and no significant armed 
force to oppose them, the McKinley administration could afford to develop a lasting U.S. 
policy toward Cuba, one which unfortunately denied it of much of its independence. Only 
Cuban and American public sentiments and anti-imperialist opposition within the United 
States prevented the expansionists in the McKinley administration and the Republican 
Congress from annexing Cuba outright.   
Immediately upon after the surrender of the Spanish in Santiago de Cuba the U.S. 
Army’s officers and War Department started to implement the measures they needed to 
control the population, monopolize military force, and sustain their forces. Why did the 
Army’s officers instinctively take these steps? After thirty years of garrisoning the American 
frontier and enforcing the U.S. government’s policies through the threat or application of 
military force, the Army’s senior and middle-grade officers relied on their experiences as a 
frontier constabulary. In many ways the U.S. Army as an institution was more prepared to 
occupy and govern Cuba than it was to conduct the major combat operations during the 
attack on Santiago de Cuba. Only the few old Civil War veterans commanding large 
formations during the war with Spain had fought in a conventional war before. For thirty 
years the Army had not even conducted military maneuvers larger than a regiment to prepare 
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its officers maneuvering large formations in battle or on campaign.272 Although some 
campaigns during the Indian Wars featured brigade-sized columns of U.S. soldiers, the 
soldiers never fought a conventional battle or faced a regular foe. However, almost every 
single senior member of the Regular U.S. Army’s officer corps had spent years on the 
American frontier fighting irregular warfare and enforcing federal policy on frequently 
unwilling settlers and Indians. 
Robert M. Utley, perhaps the most renowned historian on the U.S. Army during the 
Indian Wars, summarized Generals William T. Sherman’s and General Philip Sheridan’s 
strategy to control Indian and settlers and a “systematic pacification … by advancing a line 
of forts.”273 Utley describes how the purpose of the system of forts on the American frontier 
was to be “comprehensive enough to cover all potential trouble spots and strongly enough 
held to permit the prompt application of force sufficient to meet possible contingencies.”274 
The forts that the U.S. Army established in Santiago Province followed this same basic 
strategy that it used on the American frontier. 
Just as in Santiago, the garrisons on the American frontier also served as logistical 
bases for constabularies. The soldiers stationed at these posts within close distance of 
potential enemies could be sustained more easily than sending military expeditions over 
arduous terrain, encumbered with slow moving supply trains.275 Similar to those in Santiago, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006), 259. 
273 Robert Marshall Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Macmillan, 
1974), 46. 
274 Robert Marshall Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Macmillan, 
1974), 47. 
275 Robert Marshall Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Macmillan, 
1974), 288. 
	   111	  
the forts established in the American West were also located as close to rail and navigable 
rivers as the strategic situation allowed. This explains why during the Sioux campaign in the 
1870s, the U.S. Army located all of its camps on rivers to ease supply or on the center 
reservations to control Indian populations.276 
Even the use of food as a weapon to compel the Cuban soldiers and civilians to 
comply with American policies was a tactic the Army often used on the American frontier. 
During the Sioux campaign, the U.S. Congress compelled members of the Northern 
Cheyenne to return to their Missouri River reservations and sign the Black Hills treaty by 
locating the rations they appropriated for the Cheyenne to survive the winter on the Missouri 
reservations. With no other choice than starvation, the Northern Cheyenne allowed the 4th 
Cavalry to escort them out of the their beloved Black Hills.277 The strategy of using garrisons 
to control foreign populations, the careful consideration of logistical requirements, and the 
use of food to compel compliance were institutionalized in the culture of the Army on the 
American frontier after the Civil War. Moreover, many of the same officers that conquered 
the West also occupied Santiago.  
Historians too often handicap their investigations of the nature of U.S. imperialism 
following the Spanish-American War by relying too heavily on economic and racial 
constructs to interpret U.S. motives and actions in the former Spanish colonies. While 
economic motivations certainly influenced why the United Sates created an empire and race 
did affect U.S. policy toward the subjugated people on the U.S. occupied islands, they do not 
explain how Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were occupied. Instead, historians must 
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look to the U.S. Army’s experience on the Western frontier to see how the officers and the 
Army as an institution were shaped by their time there. It is said that in war armies always 
fight their last conflict. In Santiago, the U.S. Army used the same strategy and tactics that it 
had been using for the past thirty years. 
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